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The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation
in American Labor Law
Richard R. Carlson*
INTRODUCTION
A union's involvement in the affairs of a workplace usually stems
from its "exclusive" representation of a group of employees in bar-
gaining with their employer. The union's status as the representa-
tive is based on majority rule, determined by employee voting in a
"bargaining unit" defined by employee classification and workplace
geography. By winning the election, the union earns both the right
and power to bargain for all unit employees, union members and
nonmembers alike. The employer must bargain with the exclusive
representative and must "treat with no other."'
Exclusive representation is both a practice and a principle of
law. As a practice, it is as old as the earliest forms of collective
bargaining. As a legal principle its primary source is the Wagner
Act of 1935.2 It is so well established in this country that it enjoys
a freedom from controversy unusual among the other fundamental
principles of American labor law. In fact, most American labor law-
yers for management or labor would probably find it difficult to
imagine a workable system of representation that is not exclusive.
Nevertheless, exclusive representation is not as universal as the
typical labor law text may suggest. Some American unions re-
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
1. Virginia Ry. Co. v System Federation No. 40, 300 US 515, 548 (1937).
2. 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified and subsequently amended as the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC § 151 et seq. See notes 135-61 and accompanying text for a
discussion of some earlier legal rules of exclusivity.
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present employees on a nonexclusive basis,3 and many other indus-
trialized nations with sophisticated collective bargaining systems
discourage, restrict or even prohibit an employer's recognition of a
single union as the exclusive employee representative.4
Clearly, collective bargaining is possible without a legal doctrine
of exclusivity, but there are many persuasive reasons why union
representation should be exclusive. Majority-rule based exclusivity
bolsters a union's bargaining position, legitimizes its complete con-
trol over employee bargaining within a unit and, even from the em-
ployer's perspective, simplifies the bargaining process.5 Collective
bargaining on any other basis faces considerable practical difficul-
ties. Thus, even before there was a law of exclusive representation,
American unions sought the power of exclusivity without the bene-
fit of enabling law. They needed authority to act as exclusive rep-
resentatives in order to bargain effectively and maintain employee
solidarity.
In the pre-Wagner Act era, however, a union's preservation of
exclusivity depended partly on coercion not only against an em-
ployer but also against the very employees the union sought to
serve.6 Union coercion was no worse than many common forms of
employer coercion against employees, and in many respects union
coercion was less severe, but a union's coercion undermined the
legitimacy of its representative status. The law of exclusivity pro-
vides a partial solution to this problem. Under certain circum-
stances it grants a union exclusive representative authority based
on the legitimizing effect of "majority rule." The union gains
power over employee bargaining by operation of law rather than by
coercion. But the solution creates other difficulties for unions.
On balance, the law of exclusive representation served American
3. See notes 276-90 and accompanying text.
4. In some nations one union may acquire "preferential" bargaining rights, but not
to the complete exclusion of other unions. In others, law or practice may require an em-
ployer to bargain with several unions simultaneously with respect to the same group of em-
ployees, sometimes through a process of proportional representation. See Tiziano Treu,
General Report: Procedures and Structures of Collective Bargaining at the Enterprise and
Plant Levels, 7 Comp Labor L 219, 231-33 (1986). See also Kiyohiko Hagizawa, Procedures
and Structures of Collective Bargaining at the Enterprise and Plant Levels in Japan, 7
Comp Labor L 277, 289 (1986); William B. Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor
Law 16, 26, 37-39, 118 (MIT Press, 1984); Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Relations 8
(Great Britain), 46-48 (France), 88-95 (Italy) (1980).
5. See note 134. Employers, as a group, have not vigorously opposed exclusivity in
principle as much as they have opposed an independent or outside union's exclusivity. See
notes 116-120, 124-25, 148-49 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 25-99 and accompanying text.
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unions well for the first few decades of wide-ranging federal regula-
tion of labor relations. Indeed, for a few years collective bargaining
by exclusive representation appeared well on its way toward be-
coming the predominant vessel for employee negotiation and con-
frontation with employers.7 But, during the last two or three de-
cades, collective bargaining entered a state of decline that has
persisted for many years through several business and political cy-
cles.8 At the very least its growth has stalled far short of the appar-
ent expectations of the promoters of the Wagner Act. Exclusivity
and other provisions in the National Labor Relations Act9 (herein-
after "the NLRA") facilitating collective bargaining have not been
enough to overcome employer hostility or economic and social ob-
stacles to the growth of collective bargaining.
The American labor movement's failure to attract a wider fol-
lowing has many causes. At least part of its difficulty is that the
NLRA is designed to promote a single model of employee repre-
sentation: collective bargaining based on exclusive representation.
United States labor law does not absolutely prohibit alternative
models of representation, but it tends to discourage them. Many of
the special powers and rights the Act grants employees, and nearly
all the rights it grants their "representatives," have no genesis
without exclusivity. Yet it is safe to assume that the great majority
of employees, especially in the private sector, will not have union
representation on that basis in the foreseeable future.10
7. The immediate impact of the Act was a tripling in union membership from less
than three million before the Act to nearly nine million only five-years later. In the next five
year period the movement continued to grow rapidly to more than fourteen million mem-
bers. Derek Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 57 (1970) (citing statis-
tics of the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics).
8. Union membership peaked in about 1955 when over a third of American workers
belonged to unions, but since that time total union membership has been in a slow decline.
Since the total American workforce has continued to grow after 1955, the decline in the
labor movement's share of the workforce has been even more precipitous. As of 1990, union
members constituted only one sixth of the American workforce. Union Membership Stays
on Downward Trend, Falling to 16.1 Percent of Employment, Daily Labor Report B-1 (Feb
7, 1991).
In at least one sector, government employment, unions appear to be on the rise. Id. How-
ever, public employee unions act outside the operation of the National Labor Relations Act
and they often serve their members without the benefit of exclusivity. See notes 276-85 and
accompanying text.
9. 29 USC § 151 et seq (1988).
10. The prevailing theme of nearly all current labor law literature is that the tradi-
tional system for collective bargaining has failed. See, for example, Paul C. Weiler, Gov-
erning the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law (Harvard University
Press, 1990); The Labor Law Group, The Park City Papers iii-iv (1985); Richard Freeman &
James Medoff, What do Unions Do? 221-44 (Basic Books, 1984). At a Workshop on Labor
1992
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This article reconsiders the importance of exclusivity to Ameri-
can labor unions, its role in American labor law, and the possibili-
ties for alternative forms of representation. Part One reviews the
origins of exclusivity and its evolution into modern federal labor
law. This retrospective includes a discussion of the usefulness of
exclusivity, union methods for achieving exclusivity before the
Wagner Act, the importance of exclusivity as an issue in the early
development of American labor law, and its continuing importance
to the labor movement today.
Part Two describes how the doctrine of exclusivity limits the or-
ganization and representation of employees and may be stifling the
American labor movement's further evolution and expansion. Ex-
clusivity restrains the expansion of union representation because it
requires "majority rule" as the basis for representation, and the
procedures for determining majority rule create strong headwinds
against union representation. The system leaves most employees
without union representation, even though it appears that millions
desire representation on some basis.
Part Two also considers other methods of representation that do
not require exclusivity and that may offer new opportunities for
the labor movement. Variations of the Wagner Act model, such as
nonexclusive representation based on individualized consent, al-
ready exist in some workplaces in this country and in many work-
places abroad. Nonexclusive representation holds increasing poten-
tial in the contemporary workplace, especially with the re-
emerging importance of nonbargaining activities such as enforce-
ment of employee protection statutes. Unfortunately, the viability
of nonexclusive representation as a substantial alternative for
American workers is uncertain. Traditional unions strongly prefer
exclusivity for economic and especially historic reasons. Even more
importantly, American labor law discourages variation, especially
in the form of nonexclusive representation, because it reserves the
most important rights for majority-elected exclusive representa-
tives, and it restricts the activities of "minority" unions. Thus, as
this article suggests, a price of our "national labor policy" has been
and Employment Law sponsored by the American Association of Law Schools on April 9-10,
1992, participants seemed nearly unanimous in their opinion that traditional collective bar-
gaining would see no resurgence without a substantial change in the law. Professor Samuel
Estreicher, for example, predicted that "nothing other than fundamental changes are likely
to reverse the long term decline of unions." David Silberman, Associate General Counsel for
the AFL-CIO, was moved to protest that he was not yet a "dinosaur."
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the loss of experimentation that could give new life to labor
relations.
I. THE ORIGIN AND ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
A. Exclusive Representation and Bargaining Power
American unions routinely seek exclusive status in units where
they represent employees, and they regard any lesser status as a
complete failure and cause for withdrawal. A union may offer "as-
sociate" membership to an employee in a workplace where the
union's organizational effort has failed, but the main effect of asso-
ciate membership is merely to qualify the employee for participa-
tion in union benefit plans such as group insurance. Associate
membership does not mean the union "represents" the employee
in dealings with the employer. The union likely has no desire to
represent an employee unless representation will be exclusive for
the entire bargaining unit, because the union regards exclusivity as
essential to effective representation, at least in collective
bargaining."
The fact that exclusivity is designed specifically to aid a union's
collective bargaining function is important, because unions and
their historical precursors have also existed for other purposes that
depend very little on exclusivity. Some of their other purposes
have been political action, lobbying, private law enforcement, mu-
tual welfare (such as providing insurance and pension benefits)
and, for some public employee unions and foreign unions, "consul-
tation." 2 At some points in history and for a few unions even to-
day, these nonbargaining functions have been at least equal to bar-
gaining in importance. For example, some foreign unions exist as
much for political action as for the kind of "collective bargaining"
known to American employees. 3
11. See text accompanying notes 17-27. See also Herbert Northrup, "New" Union'
Approaches to Membership Decline: Reviving the Policies of the 1920's? 12 J Labor Re-
search 333 (1991). At the American Association of Law Schools Workshop on Labor and
Employment Law in Washington, D.C. on April 11, 1992, the AFL-CIO's Associate General
Counsel David Silberman described organized labor's increasing disillusionment with "asso-
ciate membership" programs. Among other reasons he listed was that a union could not
make "associate membership" sufficiently attractive to employees without the ability to en-
gage the employer in effective collective bargaining.
12. See Bok & Dunlop, Labor and the American Community at 82 (cited in note 7);
David Saposs, Colonial and Federal Beginnings, 1 History of Labour in the United States
49-52, 77-87, 124-25, 189-92 (The Macmillan Co., 1918); Sidney Webb & Beatrice Webb,
Industrial Democracy 247-49 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1914).
13. Perhaps the most impressive recent example is Solidarity in Poland, which was
1992 783
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Private collective bargaining, or the "business unionism" orien-
tation, of American labor organizations is largely a product of the
American labor movement's particular history. Near the end of the
nineteenth century, American unions confronted a choice between
throwing the weight of their efforts at political and legislative ac-
tion, or at private contract bargaining with employers. 14 Some
American labor leaders advocated political action, ranging from
revolution to pragmatic legislative reform, but in contrast with
their European counterparts American labor leaders found it diffi-
cult to organize workers under broad utopian or ideological causes.
Part of this difficulty may have been due to the much heralded
"individualism" of American workers.1" Perhaps more important
was the prospective effectiveness of political action versus private
collective bargaining within the American political and economic
system. Nineteenth century American workers and unions mea-
sured the great effort and very modest successes of their early leg-
islative programs, and began to find private bargaining more prom-
ising. Private bargaining yielded the quickest and most tangible
results, especially for the best established craft unions. In restros-
pect it is not surprising that most American unions, with the en-
couragement of the American Federation of Labor, chose private
bargaining with employers as their central function.16
Their choice led ineluctably to the development of an elaborate
legal institution for exclusive representation. Having elected to
pursue private, collective bargaining with employers, unions
needed some way of gaining and preserving economic power in or-
der to compel employers to bargain. Such economic power de-
kended on a union's ability to command the support and coopera-
instrumental in revolutionizing that nation's politics.
14. See generally William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement 37-58 (1991).
15. The importance of the "individualism" of American employees and employers in
the development of American labor law and policy was a principal theme of Derek Bok's
classic article, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 Harv L
Rev 1394 (1971); Bok & Dunlop, Labor and the American Community at 50-51 (cited in
note 7). Lately some scholars have questioned whether American workers were or are truly
more individualistic than their European counterparts. See Forbath, Law and the Shaping
of the American Labor Movement at 10-36 (cited in note 14).
16. See generally, Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Lobor Movement
at 37-58 (cited in note 14). Another possible reason for the American labor movement's
preference for private bargaining is that unions, lacking ideological appeal, were forced to
appeal to employees on "material" grounds, and bargaining tended to reap more immediate




tion of the employees and to speak as the employees' exclusive
representative.
The problem of economic power has been acute for unions be-
cause employers of every era have prefered to deal individually
with employees. Generally, an employer will not bargain collec-
tively unless a law or a union's economic power requires it to do so.
If the law does require collective bargaining, the union will still
need some economic power over the employer if collective bargain-
ing is to achieve any tangible gains over individual bargaining. Col-
lective bargaining without any real bargaining power is little more
than consultation.
17
A union derives economic power from its ability to create and
maintain employee solidarity in (1) joining collective action against
the employer, (2) providing financial support for collective activi-
ties, and (3) cooperating with the union's effort to present a com-
mon front in negotiations with the employer. While employee soli-
darity is important for the first two purposes, complete
cooperation of all employees is essential only for purposes of con-
tract negotiations, and it is here that the doctrine of exclusivity
has its principal effect.
Unanimous employee support is not necessary for a union to
take economic action, such as a strike, against an employer. The
potency of a strike certainly is greatest when the union enjoys very
wide support among the employees, but a union need not and can-
not always count on the willing and unanimous support of employ-
ees in a strike. Some incumbent employees who disagree with the
union's cause or are unwilling to bear the personal cost of a strike
may continue to work. An employer may be able to fill some or all
struck jobs by hiring new employees who will not cooperate with
the union's strike. The American law of exclusivity offers no assis-
tance to a union in this regard. Aside from a member's voluntary
and contractual acceptance of membership obligations, there is no
law that compels an employee (especially a nonmember of the
union) to cooperate with a union's strike, and despite the doctrine
of exclusive representation many employees in unionized work-
17. The duty to bargain under the NLRA requires an employer to "meet at reasona-
ble times and confer in good faith," but it "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 USC § 158(d). The difference between
illegal "surface" bargaining and hard but good faith bargaining is very subtle. Even if the
National Labor Relations Board detects an employer's lack of good faith, it cannot require
the employer to agree to any particular terms with a union. H.K. Porter Co. v NLRB, 397
US 99 (1970). The usual remedy is to require more bargaining.
1992 785
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places reject union membership and refuse to abide by member
obligations."8
A union does not need unanimous employee support for a strike
because a work stoppage and picketing by a significant number of
employees may cause the employer enough trouble that it will
make concessions to the union to prevent the strike. Moreover, a
striking union can obtain the involuntary participation of some un-
supportive employees by means of a picket line, "shunning," or
other coercive but lawful measures. If a strike and picket line still
lack sufficient support among employees, the union's action never-
theless may have some effectiveness because of its "secondary" ef-
fects. Sympathetic or frightened consumers may avoid the em-
ployer's business in such great numbers that the employer's ability
to maintain production becomes meaningless because he cannot
sell his product or services. Persons making deliveries or pickups at
the employer's business, or independent contractors performing
work for the employer, may also choose not to cross the picket line,
causing further trouble for the employer. Thus, while the degree of
employee support is an important factor in the success of a strike,
unanimous support is not essential, and the doctrine of exclusivity
is not designed to assure unanimous support.
A union's bargaining power also depends on its ability to enlist
widespread financial support from the employees it represents.
Again, a wide base of support among the employees is important,
but usually a union cannot and need not expect the financial sup-
port of all employees. At least a few individuals will withhold fi-
nancial support because they believe the costs too great and the
rewards too uncertain.
The nonsupport of a few individuals can be troubling for a
union. So-called "free-riders" will dampen the enthusiasm of many
supporters because the benefits a union achieves are collective in
the sense that each employee can enjoy benefits (such as higher
18. Even in a so-called "union shop," where an employer and union have seemingly
agreed to require "membership" as a condition of employment, the employer and union
must not require actual membership but only financial support (in the form of dues obliga-
tions) for the costs of collective bargaining. A requirement of actual membership and adher-
ence to all obligations of membership would violate the nondiscrimination provisions of the
NLRA. See NLRB v General Motors Corp., 373 US 734 (1963). Even if an employee be-
comes a member, the union is helpless to prevent or restrict the employee's subsequent
resignation and avoidance of contractual membership obligations. Pattern Makers' League
of North America v NLRB, 473 US 95 (1985). Thus, even in the midst of a strike, a member
who wishes to cross the picket line without liability for union "fines" may simply resign his
membership. Id.
786 Vol. 30:779
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wage rates or a safer workplace) without having to support the
unionl." Under these circumstances, some employees who support
collective bargaining in principle could conclude that active sup-
port is never in their best interests, because it is not necessary to
make any personal sacrifice to share in the gains from other em-
ployees' sacrifices.
Again, however, the support of all employees is not essential for
a union to achieve significant gains. Under current law, unions in
many states lack the power to impose a duty of financial support
on all employees. 0 Nevertheless, unions in these "right to work"
states have proved viable, even if they are weaker than they could
be with an enforceable right to financial support.21 While the "free-
rider" problem may be a source of irritation and a temptation for
nonsupport by others, a union can prevent a collapse of financial
support by a variety of means, including "checkoff," authorization
agreements, "shunning" of nonsupporters, and the threat that the
union will cease effective representation if too many employees fail
to provide support. Moreover, if a union has the exclusive power to
bargain for employees, its power over bargaining will encourage fi-
nancial support by many employees who did not or would not
favor the union's representation. Employees who do not wish to
19. See Freeman & Medoff, What Do Unions Do? at 8-9 (cited in note 10); DouglasLeslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va L Rev 353, 354-60 (1984). For example, an employer's
promise to pay a certain wage rate necessarily benefits all the employer's employees. The
same is true of the creation of a safer workplace or various job security measures such as a
contractual prohibition against unjust discharge.
In theory some collective benefits might be apportioned according to the contribution of
each employee. A union might negotiate wage increases only for employees who are activemembers. However, it is quite likely that any improvement in wages obtained by union
members will in fact be shared by all, if only because the employer will not want to be seenfavoring and encouraging those who engage in collective action. Furthermore, some collec-
tive benefits, such as a safe workplace, cannot be apportioned even if a union and employer
wished to do so.
There are also legal problems with any attempt to apportion benefits because of rules that
are partly a consequence of the doctrine of exclusive representation. The NLRA prohibits
discrimination designed to encourage or discourage union membership, 29 USC § 158(a)(3),and the federal common law of labor relations requires a union to provide fair representa-
tion for all employees, regardless of union membership. See note 235.
20. Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 164(b), permits the
states to determine whether a "union shop" agreement is lawful. Twenty states now prohibitsuch agreements. Julius Getman & Bertrand Pogrebin, Labor Relations: The Basic
Processes, Law and Practice 323 (1988).
21. In states that permit union shop agreements, about ten percent of represented
employees are nonmembers. In states prohibiting union shop agreements, about twenty per-cent of represented employees are nonmembers. See Freeman & Medoff, What Do Unions
Do? at 243 (cited in note 10).
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have union representation may nevertheless join the union in order
to participate in the governance of their representative and to as-
sure fair and equal treatment in negotiations and grievance
processing. Even the employer may aid the union in encouraging
continued employee membership and financial support (or at least
it will not discourage continued membership) if it understands
that a de facto union shop improves the union's ability to forge
compromises without fear of employee defections. 2
While unanimous employee support is not necessary to engage in
a strike or to finance collective activities, unanimous cooperation is
essential to a union's control of bargaining and contract formation
with an employer. If even a very few number of employees do not
submit to the union's control over contract negotiations, an em-
ployer can eventually destroy the union's support among the other
employees. Through individual negotiations, an employer can
demonstrate its power to grant and allocate benefits, and it can
portray the union as needless and ineffectual. Worse for the union,
an employer can use individual negotiation with nonunion employ-
ees to reward them for their rejection of the union and to en-
courage other employees to defect.
Laws prohibiting employer favoritism or discrimination are a
partial solution to this problem, but a more complete solution re-
quires the uniformity of employment terms that results from a
union's exclusive control over negotiations. The possibility of any
variation in individual employment terms is a potential threat to a
union.2 3 Variations, even without an express linkage with opposi-
tion to the union, may send an implicit, seductive and quietly re-
peated message that things could be better without the union. The
message may be especially appealing when combined with a steady
22. The extent to which "right to work laws" impede unionization or weaken union
bargaining power is unclear. One early study tended to minimize the impact of "right to
work" laws. See Frederick Meyers, Effects of "Right to Work Laws: A Study of the Texas
Act, Industrial and Labor Relations Rev 77 (Oct 1955). More recent studies suggest such
laws do have an impact, although they do not make union activity impractical. See Freeman
& Medoff, What Do Unions Do? at 242-43 (cited in note 10).
23. See J. I. Case Co. v NLRB, 321 US 332 (1944), where Justice Jackson wrote:
Advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvan-
tages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of
represenative; increased compensation if individually deserved, is often earned at the
cost of breaking down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the group,
and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the long-range expense of the group
as a whole.. . . We cannot except individual contracts generally from the operation
of collective ones because some may be more individually advantageous.
J.L Case Co., 321 US at 338-39.
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erosion of the comparative security and economic status of union
supporters. Eventually the spirit of collective action will give way
to self-interest and individualism.
A union also needs complete control over contract negotiations
to prevent disruptive competition from other labor organizations.
Such competition often benefits an employer and robs collective
action of many of its advantages. The employer may favor the
most compromising union by offering recognition and a contract,
thereby discouraging employee support for the other. The em-
ployer may also work covertly to aggravate suspicion and contempt
between the rivals, dividing and eventually conquering both camps
of union activity. In the absence of a competing union the em-
ployer might even create one, skillfully manipulate it to appeal to
the employees, but deny it any real independence.24
A union can blunt these employer weapons if it has the power to
command the cooperation of all employees in negotiation and con-
tract formation. In other words, a union needs power to act as the
employees' exclusive representative. It must be able to require the
employer to deal with the union before making any changes, even
for the better, for any single employee or group of employees; it
must be able to prevent the employer from seeking or entertaining
negotiations with any other individual or group; and it must be
able to nullify the results of any such negotiations.
A union's power to command unanimous employee cooperation
is important to its bargaining power in at least one other way. A
positive incentive for an employer's agreement to a collective con-
tract is the union's promise not to strike or engage in other eco-
nomic warfare during the duration of the contract. A guarantee of
labor peace and the certainty that labor costs can be predicted
with relative certainty over an agreed period of time are a union's
principal inducements for an employer's acceptance of a collective
bargain. But the employer will not take the guarantee for very
much if the union does not represent and control the whole unit of
employees. A well-timed "wildcat" strike by a substantial minority
of employees, possibly led by a rival union, may still be a serious
threat to the employer, especially if it has no practical recourse
against the union or the employees. Even a very small minority's
24. Before the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employer domination
and support of a union, 29 USC § 158(a)(2), "company unions" created or favored by an
employer were one of the most popular and effective employer techniques for combatting




strike can achieve much the same impact as a more representative
union's strike depending on the secondary effects.25
The need for a system to bind all employees to the collective
agreement, with or without unanimous consent, leads to another
aspect of the problem of a union's bargaining power: the legitmacy
of a contract made by a union on behalf of all employees when the
union lacks unanimous support. If all employees are union mem-
bers and consent unanimously to the union's representation, there
are only a few technical difficulties in ascribing some contractual
effect to the union's agreement as to all employees. There may be
problems of proof of individual consent, or questions about the
person (union or individual employees) with whom the employer is
contracting, but there are a number of solutions to these legal
problems.2 6 The more serious practical problem for a union is the
difficulty of gaining the unanimous consent of employees. Such
unanimity is rare in workplaces of significant size.
Absent a law of exclusive representation, a collective bargaining
agreement lacking unanimous consent would raise some difficult
questions. What effect would the agreement have as to employees
who refused to join the union and did not consent to the union's
representation? The possibility that the agreement might not be
binding on all employees would deprive the union of the full value
of its promise not to strike. The possibility that different wage
rates and conditions of employment might apply to nonmembers
would also create the danger of demoralizing employer discrimina-
tion and favoritism. However, if a union is the exclusive represen-
tative of all employees, it has the power to bind every employee
regardless of consent or membership. The doctrine of exclusive
representation provides this power.2 7 The union-employer contract,
including the promise not to strike, applies to all within the bar-
gaining unit by operation of the union's exclusive right to negotiate
25. For examples of the difficulties this threat presented to early collective bargaining
relationships, see Herbert Schreiber, The Origin of the Majority Rule and the Simultane-
ous Development of Institutions to Protect the Minority: A Chapter in Early American
Labor Law, 25 Rutgers L Rev 237, 238-58 (1971); Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Stanley
Hillman and the Rise of American Labor 69-72 (Free Press, 1991).
26. Before the advent of modern labor law legislation, courts that gave any legal ef-
fect to collective bargaining agreements used at least three different theories in applying the
agreements to individual employees: (1) a union's agreement established a custom or usuage
which employees implicitly adopted in their individual contracts with the employer; (2) the
union was an "agent" of its members, with authority to make agreements on the employees'
behalf; and (3) employees were third party beneficiaries of the union's contract. See Note,
Collective Labor Agreements, 31 Colum L Rev 1156 (1931).




B. Exclusivity Before Modern Labor Law: Problems of Coercion
and Legitimacy
A modern union gains the power of exclusive representation by
operation of law when it establishes majority support among a spe-
cific group of employees. As a bargaining practice, however, exclu-
sivity predates modern labor law. During the "common law" era of
union-management relations, 8 the law not only failed to provide a
doctrine of exclusivity, it was often antagonistic to the very idea of
collective bargaining.29 Nevertheless, early unions sometimes
achieved exclusivity in collective bargaining without the benefit of
supportive legal principles.
Exclusivity by some means is vital to effective collective bargain-
ing, but in the absence of a legal doctrine it also poses a frustrating
dilemma. Important as it is, exclusivity is unattainable without
some sacrifice of individual employee autonomy. Before modern
federal labor law, a union usually could not achieve and preserve
its representative status without the exercise of some form of coer-
cion.30 Thus, the labor movement's drive for exclusivity, and its
willingness to sacrifice individual autonomy, tended to cloud its
standing in American law and politics.
Unions used coercion because there was no other effective way of
protecting their status. Initially, a union might win substantial
support among a group of employees by peaceful persuasion and a
self-evident mutuality of interests. In the face of active employer
opposition, however, a union's peaceful persuasion was often futile.
All other things being equal, an employer's persuasion was likely to
succeed much better than a union's because the employer enjoyed
the advantage of a relationship which, for most employees, was in-
herently coercive. The employer might be quite explicit in the ex-
ercise of coercive power, such as by threatening union supporters
with discharge or other retribution, or it might rely on the implic-
itly coercive understanding that it would not reward behavior that
displeased it. In response, unions developed coercive methods of
varying lawfulness to maintain control over bargaining and also to
compel employee participation in strikes and other union
28. By this I mean the period of time, lasting until the early twentieth century, when
labor law was chiefly court-made law built on the common law of contracts and torts.
29. See notes 35-77 and accompanying text.




Plainly unlawful coercion, such as violence, was never likely to
offer an acceptable solution to the need for exclusivity or employee
participation. In a society with strong traditions of democracy and
government by law, violent coercion negates any possible legiti-
macy of a union's claim of representative status. There are, how-
ever, at least a few forms of coercion that are not clearly unlawful
but may be stronger than peaceful persuasion.
The most rudimentary nonviolent coercion is "shunning," or a
union's concerted refusal to associate in any social or economic
fashion with a nonmember. Shunning may be combined with other
acts of humiliation, such as name-calling and insults. In tightly
knit communities shunning may be all a union needs to maintain a
fairly high level of support and conformity. 1 In the event of a
strike, a union may intensify the humiliation and embarassment of
shunning with a picket line, which exposes nonstrikers to a guan-
tlet of scrutiny, hostility and ridicule.
Shunning eventually evolved into a more sophisticated form of
coercion: the "union shop.' '3 2 Early unions enforced their wage
rates by prohibiting members from working in any shop that em-
ployed nonmembers or paid any person less than the union rate.33
An employer who depended on any amount of union labor could
not risk offending the union by employing a nonmember. Non-
members who found work despite the union were exposed to other
forms of shunning.
A sufficiently powerful union, able to obtain the cooperation of
all local employers in hiring members only, gained the forced coop-
eration of each employee or prospective employee as well. Employ-
ees were compelled by circumstances to seek membership in the
union if they wished to work at all. Moreover, as union members
the employees were bound to the union's rules, enforceable by the
threat of fines or expulsion, and expulsion was often the equivalent
of a loss of livelihood.
31. Shunning need not be an organized effort by the union itself. Union supporters
are likely to shun nonunion employees, especially during a crisis in relations with the em-
ployer, with or without any direction from the union. Many employees will cooperate with a
union because their fear of the hatred of fellow employees, neighbors and family is greater
than their fear of employer retaliation.
32. Saposs, Colonial and Federal Beginnings, 1 History of Labour in the United
States at 130-32 (cited in note 12); Henry Hoagland, Humanitarianism, 1 History of Labour
in the United States 596-600 (1918).
33. Saposs, Colonial and Federal Beginnings, 1 History of Labour in the United
States at 130-32 (cited in note 12).
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During the common law era, less-than-plainly unlawful forms of
coercion were often effective for unions to gain and preserve exclu-
sivity, but these techniques also tainted unions and worsened their
already poor standing before the courts.3 4 While shunning, picket-
ing and union shop arrangements do not require any violence or
other necessarily lawless behavior, they do involve a form of com-
pulsion. They are designed to control the behavior of employees
who would not otherwise cooperate with or support a union in col-
lective bargaining with an employer. Moreover, the goals of union
compulsion were highly suspect in American law. Employee agree-
ments fixing wages were subject to challenge under precepts of eco-
nomic liberalism and individualism that were emerging during the
labor movement's infancy."'
Wage fixing interfered unnaturally with the free play of eco-
nomic forces and resulted in "arbitrarily" high rates, all to the det-
riment of the public. In early American jurisprudence, however, it
was the use of "coercion" more than the agreement to fix wages
that tainted unions. Price or wage fixing, per se, was not widely
condemned in early America, and employers were on tenuous
ground ip arguing otherwise. Private agreements between enter-
prises to adjust prices and reduce price competition were neither
uncommon nor unlawful provided the agreements were "volun-
tary.)3 6 A court might refuse to enforce such an agreement, but a
private agreement among a small group of producers could still
work very effectively without judicial enforcement if the producers
were voluntarily cooperative and the cost of establishing a new
business was sufficently high to discourage potential outside
competitors.
Employers might similarly cooperate in determining what wages
they would pay. Labor union action to fix wages, however, was
quite a different matter. A union typically sought to govern a very
34. See notes 47-77 and accompanying text. See also Recorder Levy's charge to the
jury in Commonwealth v Pullis (Philadelphia Mayor's Court, 1806), reprinted in 3 Doc His-
tory of Am Ind Soc 228 (Commons, 2d ed 1910):
The usual means by which the prices of work are regulated are the demand for the
article and the excellence of its fabric.. . . These are the means by which prices are
regulated in the natural course of things. To make an artificial regulation, is. . . to
fix a positive and arbitrary price, governed by no standard, controled by no impartial
person, but dependent on the will of the few who are interested; this is the unnatural
way of raising the price of goods or work.
35. See generally, Edwin Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L J 825 (1926).




numerous and fractious group of employees, and even if it could
gain the unanimous support and cooperation of local laborers there
was a substantial risk that newcomers would undermine the
union's wage rates.
With respect to nonmembers and newcomers, unions sometimes
asserted a right, of dubious source, to regulate any laborers who
performed any work within a certain jurisidiction, regardless of
membership in a union. Such an assertion offended many early
American judges. To a judge, a union might resemble a conspiracy
to usurp the state's "legislative" and "police" powers rather than a
free association to achieve mutual and voluntary cooperation.
Union rhetoric and conduct tended to reinforce the judiciary's per-
ception.3 7 Unlike small price-setting associations of business enter-
prises, for which mutual cooperation was fairly easy to manage, un-
ions of employees typically depended on coercion to enforce their
regulation of wages and working conditions. Unions presumed to
set wages for all employees regardless of union membership, and
they enforced their laws by shunning, picketing and other acts de-
priving employers and employees of their free will. Thus, unions
were susceptible to two charges. First, they had arrogantly usurped
the powers of government, and second, they purported to exercise
these powers for a disfavored purpose, namely wage fixing.
Still, the argument so valuable to employers, that unions were
different from other voluntary associations, depended almost en-
tirely on the coerciveness of unions, and this point was not lost on
either side. Defenders of early unions frequently invoked freedom
of association and likened a union of employees to an association
of entrepreneurs joined in the pursuit of some common economic
good. As for union strike action, employees were surely free to
choose not to work for any employer, and a concerted refusal
should be no less lawful. Unions also appealed to democratic senti-
ments. After all, unions were generally among the most democratic
institutions in early America insofar as their internal governance
and decision-making went. If some members disagreed with a
union's actions, at least the decision to take action represented the
"majority's" will.
But the charge of coercion, if well-founded, was the most diffi-
cult for a union. There were generally three defenses. The first was
denial, or the admission of only those forms of coercion that were
not clearly illegal. A second was that the best ideals and virtues of
37. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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American democracy could not be realized as long as there were
gross disparities in power and wealth between labor and manage-
ment, and that unions and their methods were essential to achiev-
ing an "equality" of power. 8 This ideological argument was unper-
suasive and possibly even offensive to many judges."
A third argument was that each union possessed a natural au-
thority over matters pertaining to the trade it represented. In a
sense, according to this view, the union was the trade, and a
worker was subject to the union's rules by virtue of his labors in
the trade.4° Accordingly, labor leaders thought it entirely appropri-
ate that they should act as "legislators" for the trade, and that
their rules apply to workers regardless of membership in the
union.41 This claim could be complicated by the appearance of two
unions laying claim to the same trade, but increasingly large and
sophisticated federations of labor organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, provided a higher labor government to
resolve such jurisdictional disputes.
42
The judiciary was generally unreceptive to all three arguments,
even when it was unclear whether a union's coercion was actually
unlawful. To the labor movement's appeal for economic equality,
the judiciary replied with economic liberty, individualism and au-
tonomy.4 The labor movement's claim of law-making authority
earned only the judiciary's contempt.44 Unions were not even "per-
sons" or legally recognizable entities that could have any legal
standing, let alone law-making authority, before the courts.45 The
38. Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, Law
and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960, 58-59 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1985) (hereinafter "The State and the Unions').
39. See, for example, Recorder Levy's charge to the jury in Commonwealth v Pu~lis
(Philadelphia Mayor's Court, 1806) reprinted in 3 Doc History of Am Ind Soc 230 (Com-
mons, 2d ed 1910):
In every point of view, [the union's strike for uniformly higher wages] is pregnant
with public mischief and private injury ... tends to demoralize the workmen...
destroy[s] the trade of the city, and leaves the pockets of the whole community to the
discretion of the concerned.
40. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 51, 57-63, 148-49 (cited in note 38).
41. Id. See also Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 243-44, 259 (cited in note 25).
42. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 148-49 (cited in note 38); Schreiber, 25
Rutgers L Rev at 243-44, 259 (cited in note 25).
43. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 46-48, 58 (cited in note 38).
44. See notes 63, 86-88 and accompanying text.
45. The earliest federal collective bargaining legislation seemed only to encourage the
judiciary's reluctance to grant any legal character or authority to unions. For example, an
Act of Oct 1, 1888, ch 1063, 25 Stat 501 (1888), called for the creation of a presidential
commission to investigate labor disputes and it provided a method for resolving disputes by
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very assertion of such authority was in itself evidence of a union's
coercion and interference with individual liberty.
The conflict between individual liberty and the needs of collec-
tive bargaining dominated the earliest American labor law cases,
most of which involved criminal prosecutions of union leaders who
had engaged in some form of coercion to organize and enforce
strikes. The usual argument of the prosecution was that strike
leaders had criminally conspired to coerce the participation of in-
dividual workers by violent or nonviolent means. Prosecutors also
frequently argued that collective bargaining was an unlawful re-
straint of trade, but it was the appeal to individual liberty, espe-
cially on behalf of coerced employees, that proved the more suc-
cessful and enduring theme for the labor movement's opponents.46
No case better illustrates these themes of early American labor
law than the very first reported American labor law case, Common-
wealth v Pullis.47 The Pullis case was one of a series of criminal
prosecutions against associations of journeymen cordwainers (shoe-
makers), which began to form around the end of the eighteeth cen-
tury when the rising power of "master" shoemaker entreprenuers
and increasing interstate and foreign competition had begun to
erode. the journeymen's earnings.
The indictment alleged that striking cordwainers had conspired
to raise wages (according to the cordwainers, to restore them) by
agreeing among themselves not to work except at a certain mini-
mum price. As noted earlier,48 it was questionable whether price or
wage fixing by private agreement constituted a common law crime
in early America. One of the controversial aspects of the case was
that the prosecution's criminal conspiracy theory relied entirely on
British precedent.49 However, a greater potential embarrassment
for the masters, who instigated and financed the prosecution, was
the considerable if inexact evidence that they had formed their
arbitration. But the law did not recognize or provide for recognition of labor organizations.
It merely guaranteed right of employees to select "one or more persons to act for them" in
the arbitration. See Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 245 (cited in note 25).
46. See Witte, 35 Yale L J at 825-27 (cited in note 35); Tomlins, The State and the
Unions at 46-49, 58 (cited in note 38).
47. Philadelphia Mayor's Court (1806), reprinted in John R. Commons, ed, 3 Doc
History of Am Ind Soc 59 (Russell & Russell, 2d ed 1910).
48. See note 36 and accompanying text.
49. See Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 Yale L J 165 (1931);
Saposs, Colonial and Federal Beginnings, 1 History of Labour in the United States at 139-
146 (cited in note 12); Hovenkamp, 66 Tex L Rev at 932-935 (cited in note 36).
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own association to minimize price competition and set wages."0
But the indictment against the cordwainers also charged that
they had endeavored to prevent others from working for a lesser
price and had resorted to various means of coercion. Of this there
was considerable evidence,51 though the cordwainers denied it. In
comparison, there was a dearth of evidence that the masters' asso-
ciation had coerced any member or nonmember to abide by a regu-
lated price or wage. 52
The defendant cordwainers' strategy was to emphasize the dem-
ocratic features of their organization and to express their shock
that the exercise of traditional American liberties could be a crime.
They had been "accustomed to the enjoyment of the privilege se-
cured to them and all other citizens. . . to assemble together in a
peaceable manner for their common good." 58 In this regard they
were no different from other associations of merchants, profession-
als and other respectable persons to "promote commerce, agricul-
ture, the arts, or any other object."54
As to the charge that their agreement fixing wages constituted a
criminal conspiracy, they argued that logic and lack of precedent
rebutted the prosecution's theory. Admittedly, the purpose of their
association included "settling and ascertaining the price of their
own work," 55 but in this purpose there was no crime. After all, if a
worker was the "sole owner" of his labor and was free to decide
what wage he would require, there seemed to be no reason why he
and other workers could not act as a group to determine their
price. 6
The defendants denied their association had worked by compul-
sion, and the defendants' counsel was careful to avoid any claim of
right or authority of the association to impose its rules as a form of
"law" for nonmember cordwainers. Nevertheless, the evidence
was inescapable that they had sought to overcome the free will of
individual workers, and it was on this point that the prosecution
focused its attention. The prosecution had some success in showing
that individual association members believed in a right and au-
50. See, for example, Commons, ed, 3 Doc History of Am Ind Soc, at 107, 113-15,
119-20, 123, 125, 128 (cited in note 47).
51. Id at 71-107.
52. Id at 129.
53. Id at 110.
54. Id at 177.
55. Id at 110.
56. Id at 110-11.
57. See, for example, id at 146.
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thority to make rules for all the cordwainers. s More importantly,
the prosecution produced evidence of at least four methods of
compulsion used by the association to enforce its will: shunning of
nonmembers, humiliation and embarrassment of nonmembers, vio-
lence and threats of violence, and concerted refusal to work for any
shop that employed a nonmember.59
Acts of violence, of course, were unlawful, but what of shunning
or humiliation? The lawfulness of these lesser forms of coercion
was an important underlying issue because the evidence of actual
violence was scant and the named defendants' only proven com-
plicity was in shunning and humiliationY' For the prosecution's
purposes, however, any form of coercion to enforce the union's laws
would have been unlawful. The defendants were members of a
"private club" that sought to usurp the power of the legislature.6 1
Even worse, they had sought to enforce their laws by social and
economic boycott. The prosecutor argued to the jury:
If these persons claim the right to put the price on their own work, if they
say their labor is their own, and they are the judges of its value, why not
admit the same right to others? ... We stand up for the right of the jour-
neymen, as well as of the masters ..
It may be answered, that when men enter into a society they are bound to
conform to its rules; they may say, the majority ought to govern the minor-
ity. [B]ut they ought to leave a man free to join or not join the society ....
The society has no right to force you into its body, and then say you shall
obey its rules under severe penalties .... The man who seeks asylum in
58. Id at 119.
59. Professor Nelles summarized the evidence:
Job Harrison had joined the society in 1794 for fear of being scabbed: "If I did not
join the body, no man would set upon the seat where I worked, . . . nor board or
lodge in the same house, nor would they work at all for the same employer." Most of
the turn-outs [strikes] were for wages on boots; he, making only fine shoes, had noth-
ing to gain. During the turn-out of 1799, having "a wife and a large young family," he
scabbed secretly for Mr. Bedford until, having been detected by the "tramping com-
mittees" and roused to indignation by the strikers' rejection of the tearful plea of one
Dobbins for leave to support his children, he resolved to scab openly. Mr. Bedford
promised to protect him, and kept him on after the strike had been won. Mr. Bed-
ford's shop was therefore scabbed; his force, which before the strike had been twenty,
was for a year and a half reduced to four or five.... A journeyman testified: "The
name of scab is very dangerous; men of this description have been hurt when out at
night. I myself have been threatened for working at wages with which I was satisfied.
I was afraid of going near any of the body: I have seen them twisting and making wry
faces at me, and heard two men call out scab, as I passed by. I was obliged to join, for
fear of personal injury."
Nelles, 41 Yale L J at 176-177 (cited in note 49).
60. Id at 177.
61. Commons, ed, 3 Doc History of Am Ind Soc at 135 (cited in note 47).
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this country, from the arbitrary laws of other nations, is coerced into this
society .... 62
The Recorder Moses Levy, who presided over the trial, sounded
a similar chord in his instructions to the jury:
The journeymen shoemakers. say that no one shall work, unless he re-
ceives the wages they have fixed . . Is it not restraining, instead of pro-
moting, the spirit of '76 when men expected to have no law but the consti-
tution, and laws adopted by it or enacted by the legislature in conformity to
it? Was it the spirit of '79 [sic], that either masters or journeymen, in regu-
lating the prices of their commodities should set up a rule contrary to the
law of their country? . . . It is not a question, whether we shall have an
imperium in imperio, whether we shall have, besides our state legislature a
new legislature consisting of journeymen shoemakers ... . They should be
neither the slaves nor the governors of the community.1
3
The jury found the defendants guilty."' Whether the verdict
rested on the restraint of trade or the coercive enforcement is un-
clear, for Levy had also instructed the jury that even a voluntary
and uncoerced agreement among workers to fix wages would be il-
legal.6 5 In any event and for many years thereafter, Pullis served as
the best American authority for the proposition that collective ac-
tion by employees for the purpose of increasing or maintaining
wages is unlawful per se. Yet few judges endorsed this aspect of
Pullis unreservedly, and juries were disinclined to find criminal
guilt based on a mere combination. The emphasis of most prosecu-
tions following Pullis shifted inexorably to the coercive character
of a union's demands against workers and employers.6
By the middle of the nineteenth century it was fairly well estab-
62. Id at 138-39.
63. Id at 234-35
64. Id at 236.
65. Id at 233.
66. Saposs, 1 History of Labour in the United States at 140, 143, 144-45, 162-65
(cited in note 12); Edward Mittelman, Trade Unionism, 1 History of Labour in the United
States 406-07 (1918); Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 36-44 (cited in note 38); Witte,
Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L J at 825-27 (cited in note 35).
But see People v Fisher, 14 Wendell 9 (NY 1835). The prosecution in Fisher was for a
union's interference with a nonmember's employment, by striking the nonmember's em-
ployer to force his discharge. Nevertheless, the court's opinion upholding the conviction in-
dicated that prosecutors could also have indicted the union for seeking to determine, by
voluntary agreement, the wage at which its members would work. For a few months thereaf-
ter employers rallied behind the Fisher case to instigate new prosecutions of unions, but
their success in obtaining convictions was much limited by juries, which were increasingly
sympathetic to the labor movement. Saposs, 1 History of Labour in the United States at
140, 143, 144-45, 162-65 (cited in note 12); Mittelman, 1 History of Labour in the United
States at 406-07 (cited within this note).
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lished in theory that workers could attempt to set wages by volun-
tary, collective agreement among themselves without committing a
criminal conspiracy.6 7 The conspiracy theory continued to resur-
face from time to time but more often as the basis for a civil cause
of action by an employer for damages and injunctive relief.68 In
most cases, criminal or civil, the indictment or complaint was
based on a union's coercion or acts of violence against the em-
ployer, employees or other persons.6e A few judges clung to the no-
tion that collective bargaining was wrongful per se, 70 but even
these judges were often careful to dress their decisions with evi-
dence of union coercion or with reasoning that left some question
whether it was the means or the end that was unlawful.7 1 For some
judges, it seems, unions were so tainted by violence and intimida-
tion that even peaceful picketing was an implicit threat. People v
Wilzig 2 is representative of this group:
It is one thing for a man or men to go about and talk to their friends, and it
is quite another for fifty or sixty or a hundred men to band together not for
the purpose of individual persuasion, but to bring to bear the power of com-
bination in an unlawful way.. . . The men who walk up and down in front
of a man's shop may be guilty of intimidation, though they never raise a
finger or utter a word. Their attitude may nevertheless be that of menace.
They may intimidate by their numbers, their methods, their placards, their
circulars and their devices."
67. See Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 40-42 (cited in note 38); Hovenkamp,
66 Tex L Rev at 932-35 (cited in note 36). The case most cited as marking the end of the
common law criminal conspiracy theory is Commonwealth v Hunt, 45 Mass (4 Met) 111
(1842). Hunt appears to have been the first reported judicial opinion specifically to declare
that trade unions formed for collective bargaining were lawful. See generally, Walter Nelles,
Commonwealth v Hunt, 32 Colum L Rev 1128 (1932).
68. See, for example, Walker v Cronin, 107 Mass 555 (1871); Mapstrick v Ramge, 9
Neb 390 (1879); Brace Bros. v Evans, 5 Pa Cty Ct Rep 163 (1888); Underhill v Murphy, 117
Ky 640, 78 SW 482 (1904); Barr v Essex Trades Council, 53 NJE 101, 30 A 881 (1894);
Purvis v Local No. 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa 348, 61 A
585 (1906).
69. See, for example, Coeur D'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v Miners' Union of
Wardner, 51 F 260 (CCD Idaho 1892); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v Pennsylvania Co., 54 F
730 (CCDN Ohio 1893); State v Glidden, 55 Conn 46, 8 A 890 (1891); Purvis, 63 A 585
(1906); Albro J. Newton Co. v Erickson, 70 Misc 291, 126 NYS 949 (Kings Cty, 1911). See
also Selig Perlman, Nationalisation, 2 History of Labour in the United States 3, 443-44,
445, 503-09 (1966).
70. Walker, 107 Mass 555 (1871); Mapstrick, 9 Neb 390 (1879).
71. Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v McKenna, 30 F 48 (CC S D NY 1887); Brace
Bros., 5 Pa Cty Ct Rep at 171 ("Their acts were in their nature threatening and calculated
to intimidate"); Underhill, 78 SW 482 (1904).
72. 4 NY Crim R 403 (1886).
73. Wilzig, 4 NY Crim R at 413-14. See also Sherry v Perkins, 147 Mass 212, 17 NE
307 (1888); Vegelahn v Guntner, 167 Mass 44 NE 1077 (1896).
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Some judges were even inclined to speculate that it was in the na-
ture of any strike to be violent. Thus, in Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v Northern Pacific R. Co., 74 the court commented:
It has well been said that the wit of man could not devise a legal strike,
because compulsion is the leading idea of it. A strike is essentially a conspir-
acy to extort by violence; the means employed to effect the end being not
only the cessation of labor by the conspirators, but the necessary prevention
of labor by those who are willing to assume their places, and, as a last re-
sort, and in many instances an essential element of success, the disabling
and destruction of the property of the master; and so, by intimidation and
by the compulsion of force, to accomplish the end designed. I know of no
peaceable strike. I think no strike was ever heard of that was or could be
successful unaccompanied by intimidation and violence.
1 5
Even for those judges who focused carefully on a union's actual
methods of coercion, there was no clear agreement as to what a
union might lawfully do to gain the cooperation of other workers.
Commonwealth v Hunt,78 which is best known for interring the
theory that collective bargaining is unlawful per se, also held that a
union could lawfully strike against an employer to force the dis-
charge of nonmembers so as to enforce a union shop. Most other
courts of the period strongly disagreed that a union had any right
to use economic coercion to compel an employer to hire only union
members.
7
The theory that collective bargaining was per se unlawful en-
joyed a brief ressurgence with the Sherman Act, which declared
that "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade" was illegal.78 Judicial extension of this statute to labor
unions, 79 however, provoked Congress to adopt the Clayton Act,80
which barred application of the antitrust laws to collective action
by unions for their "legitimate objects." The net effect of these
laws was to expand the basis for federal court jurisdiction over la-
bor disputes and to inaugurate an era of federal judicial regulation
by injunction against the "illegitmate" objects and means of
74. 60 F 803 (CCED Wis 1894).
75. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 60 F at 821.
76. 45 Mass (4 Met) 111 (1842).
77. See, for example, Albro J. Newton Co. v Erickson, 126 NYS 949 (Kings Cty
1911); Purvis v Local No. 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 63 A 585
(1906); Berry v Donovan, 188 Mass 353, 74 NE 603 (1905); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry v Penn-
sylvania Co., 54 F 730 (CCDN Ohio 1893); State v Glidden, 55 Conn 46, 8 A 890 (1891).
78. Act of July 2, 1890, ch 647, § 1, 26 Stat 209.
79. See, for example, Gompers v Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 US 418 (1911).




Under the law of this era, so long as a union's concerted work
stoppage was for the purpose of obtaining higher wages or better
working conditions for the strikers, its action was privileged.82 Be-
yond this narrow field of permissible action, however, a union's
methods and objects were open to attack by injunction or tort
claims. Peaceful picketing might be enjoined in some jurisdictions
because, as one court pronounced, "there is and can be no such
thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vul-
garity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching.""3 Even peaceful
persuasion without picketing might be unlawful and subject to in-
junction, if it enticed nonunion employees to join the union or quit
their work in breach of one of a variety of anti-union contracts
employers often exacted from their employees.
8 4
The great preponderance of injunctions issued against unions
during the turn of the century had much less to do with union
coercion against individual workers than with "secondary" actions,
such as boycotts and sympathy strikes entangling third parties in a
struck employer's labor dispute.88 Nevertheless, the federal courts'
condemnatory language had scarcely changed from the days of
Pullis. Judges assailed unions for presuming to legislate wages and
working conditions and for purporting to assert "powers belonging
only to Government."s In Otis Steel Co. v Local 218, Iron Mold-
ers' Union,s7 for example, the court railed against the union, "a
self-constituted body of men," which had sought to enforce its
"edicts" against the employer and nonunion workers.88
Thus, organized labor's dependence on compulsion to enforce
strikes, require membership, or maintain "exclusive" control over
bargaining belied the legitimacy of its claim to represent employ-
ees and subjected it to a barrage of injunctions and civil damages
81. See Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 7-11 (Macmillian
Co., 1930).
82. Frankfurter & Green, The Labor Injunction at 26-27 (cited in note 81).
83. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v Gee, 139 F 582, 584 (SD Iowa 1905). See Frank-
furter & Greene, The Labor Injunction at 30-35 (cited in note 81).
84. See Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction at 35-42 (cited in note 81).
85. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 59-97 (cited
in note 14).
86. In re Debs, 158 US 564, 592 (1895). See generally Forbath, Law and the Shaping
of the American Labor Movement at 64-66 (cited in note 14).
Ironically, the courts just as frequently declared unconstitutional the labor laws of the
state legislatures. Id at 37-58.
87. 110 F 698 (CCND Ohio 1901).
88. Otis Steel Co., 110 F at 669-700.
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suits. Judges who often eagerly supported the employers' cause
may have felt no natural sympathy toward unions anyway. But
union coercion, and the sense of many judges that coercion was
inherent in union activity, greatly aggravated judicial hostility and
served as the principal charge judges articulated against unions.
Even colorably lawful forms of coercion were not, and likely never
could have been effective to organize a significant portion of the
workforce in an enduring way. If coercion by a union was lawful,
then so too was an employer's coercion. In the long run, a deter-
mined employer or employer association would have more powerful
coercive forces at its disposal. It could refuse to recognize the
union, retaliate with mass discharges of union supporters, discrimi-
nate, and intimidate employees with its better access to the police,
legal and business communities. If unions responded with escalat-
ing levels of coercion and violence, they further antagonized the
public and undermined their own future organizing efforts.
C. Exclusivity by Contract; Early Public Intervention in Labor
Contract Formation
The development of collective bargaining agreements between
unions and employers during the middle of the nineteenth century
suggested some solutions to a union's problem of controlling indi-
vidual workers. Before that time, unions had not bargained collec-
tively in the modern sense. They established wage rates much like
a private regulatory agency: they deliberated as a body, perhaps
with informal consultation with employers, and posted a required
minimum rate to be observed by all members and employers
within the community.89 Enforcement of the union's rates de-
pended on its threatened or actual use of the traditional means of
coercion against employers and individual employees.
Direct bargaining culminating in an agreement, however, offered
the potential advantages of exclusivity by contract. A contract
could give a union the power to control the terms of employment
for all employees as a matter of legal right enforceable by judicial
process. An individual employee's agreement to work for less than
the union's prescribed minimum wage would be a violation of the
employer's contract with the union. Of course, a union's ability to
89. See Saposs, 1 History of Labour in the United States at 121, 580-85, 602-07 (cited
in note 12). Even the phrase "collective bargaining" is of relatively recent origin. British
writers Sidney and Beatrice Webb appear to have been first to use the phrase in their book,
Industrial Democracy 173 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1914).
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obtain some judicial remedy against individual bargaining de-
pended on a court's attitude toward collective bargaining agree-
ments, and in this regard nothing could be taken for granted.
A union's right to control bargaining on behalf of all employees
did not follow automatically from the execution of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Early collective bargaining agreements took
two forms: exclusive and nonexclusive. In nonexclusive agreements,
employers agreed to recognize a union as representative only for
employees who were members of the union.90 Even if a court were
willing to enforce the agreement as a contract; it could only enforce
the agreement as to members or others who had taken some action
to "adopt" the agreement as their own. Of course, this arrange-
ment failed to provide the union with the desired control over indi-
vidual employees who reached terms separately with the employer
or who later acted with the employer to modify terms described in
the collective agreement.
In exclusive agreements, on the other hand, an employer agreed
to recognize a union as the exclusive representative for all the em-
ployees in a defined unit. On the surface, such a promise seemed to
give the union the exclusivity it needed to protect its ability to
represent employees collectively. Discriminatory terms of employ-
ment that were favorable to individual nonmembers or unfavorable
to members would constitute a breach of contract for which a court
might provide some remedy.
A union could strengthen the contractual basis for its status as
the exclusive representative by incorporating its union shop system
into the contract. In other words, it could bargain for an em-
ployer's promise not to hire any person not a member of the union.
This promise was often coupled with another requiring the em-
ployer to discharge any employee whose membership had termi-
nated because of resignation or expulsion. A union shop provision
was the only practical way of guaranteeing a union's exclusive con-
trol over bargaining, and thus in the pre-Wagner Act era exclusive
recognition of a union was synonomous with a union shop.
Still, contractual exclusivity fell far short of providing unions
with an effective and appealing way of controlling negotiations
with employers. The most obvious problem, from the individual
employee's point of view, was that an employer's complicity in en-
90. Such agreements appear to have been common even for a short time after the




forcing a union shop was no less coercive than a union's unilateral
coercion. In any event, unions were unlikely to achieve exclusive
recognition or a union shop for more than a limited number of
workplaces. Many employers resisted collective bargaining alto-
gether. If forced to bargain, they might refuse to recognize the
union as the exclusive representative, bargaining instead only as to
the union's "members." Moreover, if the union struck or engaged
in some other coercive economic action in support of its demand
for a contractual "union shop," most courts would enjoin the strike
as an illegal means or object of union activity.91
Still another failing of contractual exclusivity was that the courts
did not readily accept collective bargaining agreements as a form
of contract. Even after the near-universal rejection of the theory
that collective bargaining was illegal per se, courts were slow to
adapt the law of contracts to the special features of collective bar-
gaining agreements.92 Their opportunity to do so was limited in
part by the reluctance of unions to resort to courts at all. Perhaps
for good reason, unions had come to view the law as an adversary
and courts as the instruments of employers. 93 A union with a po-
tential breach of contract claim usually preferred to resort to tradi-
tional means of coercion against the employer and individual
employees.
Finally, a union could enjoy contractual exclusivity only so long
as the contract remained in effect. Contractual exclusivity ended
when the union needed it most, when the contract expired or ei-
ther party reopened negotiations. In the early days of collective
bargaining, when the enforceability of collective agreements was
open to question, the agreement served not so much as a contract
as a truce "at will" that might be broken at any time. Not only
could an employer seek a change in terms, it also could reopen the
question of a union's representative status and refuse any further
bargaining.94
Nevertheless, the development of collective bargaining agree-
ments was an important step toward the system of exclusive repre-
91. See note 77.
92. See William Gorham Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44
Harv L Rev 572, 572-74 (1931).
One early problem in the enforcement of labor agreements was that, under the common
law, unions were mere associations of individuals and lacked legal capacity to make con-
tracts. See Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 83-91 (cited in note 38).
93. See Rice, 44 Harv L Rev at 572-574 (cited in note 92); Tomlins, The State and
the Unions at 60-67, 83-91 (cited in note 38).
94. See Rice, 44 Harv L Rev at 574 (cited in note 92).
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sentation that culminated in the Wagner Act. Collective bargaining
offered clear if only potential advantages over the old system of
unilateral declaration of terms and "truce at will." Moreover, the
effort to gain exclusivity through collective bargaining, and the
limitations of bargaining for this purpose, revealed the need for a
different means of authorizing a single authority to represent an
entire body of employees in bargaining over a wide array of em-
ployment matters.
The creation of such authority ultimately required some level of
government intervention in what had first evolved as a purely pri-
vate bargaining transaction. The government could legitimize the
results of collective bargaining in a number of ways, including di-
rect participation in the bargaining process. In some European na-
tions, for example, government participation gives unions many of
the benefits of exclusivity without a formal appointment of exclu-
sive representatives or a law of exclusive representation. Large na-
tional unions conduct bargaining with national employer associa-
tions leading to agreements of nationwide scope. The unions are
neither "exclusive" representatives nor do they command the
unanimous support of all employees. However, the government is
at least an informal party to these national negotiations and, if it
approves of the resulting agreements, it often translates the terms
into public law by means of national legislation.
95
For the American labor movement there were a number of ob-
stacles to this type of bargaining or government involvement. Ef-
fective government involvement of the type that developed in some
European nations would have required bargaining on the national
level, but early American labor law and bargaining practices mili-
tated against national bargaining. American unions were certainly
willing and often sought the advantages of collective action on a
national scale, but when American employers "organized" it was
for the purpose of avoiding unions rather than bargaining with
them. In general, the spirit of individualism appears to have been
even stronger in American employers than in American
employees. 96
Moreover, the court-made labor law of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was inhospitable to national or other far-
reaching strike actions that might otherwise have led to national
bargaining and regulation. The greater the breadth of a union's ac-
95. Bok, 84 Harv L Rev at 1428-29, 1436-37 (cited in note 15).
96. Id at 1436-37.
806 Vol. 30:779
Exclusive Representation
tions, the more likely a federal court could find some basis for fed-
eral jurisdiction and the more likely a federal judge would find a
union had exceeded its privilege of striking for higher wages for
employees of a particular employer. "Sympathy" strikes, boycotts
against "secondary" employers, or strikes designed to coerce non-
union employers to participate in or abide by collective bargaining
were almost certain to incur the wrath of federal judges.97 After a
few spectacularly unsuccessful national strike actions, many Amer-
ican labor leaders accepted the view that they should focus on spe-
cific and limited strike actions in support of private bargaining
with individual employers.9 8
American law posed another barrier in its hostility toward any
infringement of an individual employer's or employee's liberty to
negotiate the terms of employment. The prevailing view in many
American jurisidictions was that the government had no greater
right than a union to impose terms on employers and employees. 99
Even fairly modest protective legislation regulating the payment of
wages and other working conditions faced uncertain approval in
the courts.100 Any legislative effort to give legal effect to a regional
or national wage standard, especially one created by collective bar-
gaining, faced especially stiff resistance in the courts. In Carter v
Carter Coal Co.,110 for example, the United States Supreme Court
struck down early New Deal legislation that would have given the
effect of national law to wage agreements collectively negotiated by
designated groups of employers and unions.
There was at least one industry-the railroads-where national
or regional bargaining with some government involvement began as
early as the late nineteeth century. With the Arbitration Act of
1888102 and the Erdman Act of 1898,103 Congress modestly sought
to encourage the mediation and arbitration of labor disputes in-
volving the railroads. A more spectacular example occurred during
the First World War, when the federal government briefly nation-
97. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 59-91 (cited
in note 14).
98. Id at 92-97.
99. Id at 37-58.
100. See, for example, Fiske v People, 188 IlM 206, 58 NE 985 (1900); Johnson v Good-
year Mining Co., 127 Cal 4, 59 P 304 (1899); Luman v Hitchens Bros. Co., 90 Md 14, 44 A
1051 (1899); In re Jacobs, 98 NY 98 (1895); Commonwealth v Isenberg & Rowland, 4 Pa D
579 (1895); Braceville Coal Co v People, 147 (Ill 66, 35 NE 62 (1893).
101. 298 US 238 (1936).
102. 25 Stat 501 (1888).
103. 30 Stat 424 (1898).
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alized the railroads and supervised bargaining with the major rail-
road unions. 10 4 Some of these actions, especially during World War
I, directly involved the federal government in labor negotiations.
None of these early actions, however, provided any permanent sys-
tem for identifying and defining a union's representative status,
applying an agreement to nonunion workers, or giving the agree-
ment the effect of law. Indeed, a recurring objection to and compli-
cation of these actions was the difficulty or unfairness of binding
nonunion members to union agreements. 0 5
D. Exclusivity and Industrial Democracy
When managers and judges denouced organized labor's coercive
methods and infringement of individual liberty, unions and their
supporters rejoined that collective bargaining actually fulfilled the
true goals of American society by bringing equality and democratic
authority to the workplace. In regard to their internal affairs, at
least, unions were as well-placed as any other major American in-
stitution to trumpet their democratic virtues. Early unions were by
nature especially democratic in their own governance and generally
continued democratic practices even as they become larger and
more institutionalized. 0 As the number and variety of unions in-
creased, some were also prone to call for "democratic" solutions to
the inevitable jurisdictional conflicts between overlapping craft un-
ions and between craft unions and industrial unions. In the rail-
road industry, for example, the Order of Railroad Conductors rou-
tinely invoked "majority rule" as the basis for identifying the
legitimate representative of disputed groups of employees.1
0 7
The labor movement's democratic instincts eventually affected
its strategy for dealing with management. With the development of
collective bargaining, union rhetoric increasingly included the ar-
gument that union representation would bring democracy to indus-
trial management by involving employees in making decisions
about working conditions.0 s The industrial democracy theory, first
popularized by British labor reformists Beatrice and Stanley
104. See generally, Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 258-65 (cited in note 25).
105. See generally, id at 250-71.
106. Nelles, 41 Yale L J 165 (cited in note 49); Webb & Webb, Industrial Democracy
at v-vi, 3-8 (cited in note 12). On the other hand, unions are not inherently democratic, and
unions in some other countries have developed in a less than democratic manner. Bok &
Dunlop, Labor and the American Community at 71 (cited in note 7).
107. Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 241-55, 288-89, 296-97 (cited in note 25).
108. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 77-82 (cited in note 38).
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Webb,109 suggested that collective bargaining was or ought to be
more than the negotiation of wage rates and traditional work rule
issues. Collective bargaining would lead to the creation of a work-
place "constitution" governing the very life of the workplace. In-
dustrial democracy theory also suggested a solution to the problem
of legitimacy in a union's imposition of exclusive representation.
To labor leaders espousing industrial democracy, a workplace
was a microcosm of society. Like any other community, a work-
place required some authority capable of organizing and coordinat-
ing social and economic activity. Authority might be completely
vested in management, or it might be shared in some fashion with
employees through their union. Either way, absolute individual
employee autonomy was impossible in a modern workplace, and
the best practical alternative was shared authority with a demo-
cratic union in a sort of workplace polis."0
But in actuality, industrial democracy did not mean manage-
ment by democracy in a sense truly analogous to political democ-
racy. To have achieved truly democratic industrial management
would have required the complete overthrow of industrial private
property-a revolution not sought by most American labor leaders.
By "industrial democracy," most proponents meant a system for
promoting economic equality in a way that would strengthen man-
agement's indirect accountability to the labor force. Collective bar-
gaining would not empower workers to elect or remove managers,
but the collective economic strength of the workers would serve as
a check against industrial despotism. The collective labor agree-
ment would bring the rule of "law" to the workplace and would
provide a system for the redress of injustice.
Labor organizer Clinton Golden and labor economist Harold
Ruttenberg described this theory of industrial democracy in their
book, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy.'-" A nonunion
workplace was in effect a "corporate dictatorship" where individ-
ual employee autonomy and bargaining power were illusory at best.
An employee did not decide or negotiate his wage: the employer
determined it by fiat and there was no real possibility for effective
109. Webb & Webb, Industrial Demoncracy (cited in note 12).
110. See generally, Clinton Golden and Harold Ruttenberg, The Dynamics of Indus-
trial Democracy (Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1942); Webb & Webb, Industrial Democracy
(cited in note 12); Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 Colum L Rev
556, 561-64 (1945).
111. Golden & Ruttenberg, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy (cited in note
110).
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negotiation on an individual basis. Day to day conditions of em-
ployment were governed by autocratic supervisors and foremen
whose power was enforced by the right to discipline and discharge.
"Collective bargaining," the authors argued, "changes all this."
The foreman or supervisor's kingdom is converted into a republic. The indi-
vidual worker, supported by his fellow workers, becomes a citizen. As such
he can meet his boss on an equal basis, since he has the power of the union
behind him to match the company's power behind the boss. No longer is the
judgment of the boss beyond question or his authority final and absolute.
Each worker now enjoys the democratic right to seek redress of his griev-
ances that may arise from any act of his boss .... [Collective bargaining]
parallels [his] political citizenship.
1 12
A more important proponent of industrial democracy was Sena-
tor Robert F. Wagner, who led the congressional and early labor
board efforts that culminated in a regulatory and legislative doc-
trine of exclusive representation. 113 Wagner and his colleagues on
the early federal labor boards adapted "industrial democracy" the-
ory to the evolving system of federal regulation of collective bar-
gaining in order to legitimize the power of a single representative
to speak for all employees. 1 4 "Industrial democracy" implied ma-
jority rule, and no union could purport to have installed industrial
democracy without majority support. With majority support, how-
ever, a union could plausibly claim the right to speak for all. To
Senator Wagner and like-minded adherents of industrial democ-
racy, majority rule also meant exclusive representation, preferably
by an outside labor organization with the power and courage to
bargain with management.
115
112. Id at 41-43. See also id at xxiv.
113. See Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor on S 1958, 74th
Cong, 1st Sess 46 (1935) (Statement of Senator Wagner); 79 Cong Rec 7571 (1935) (Sen.
Wagner: "democracy in industry must be based upon the same principles as democracy in
government").
114. See, for example, Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) 38 (Aug 30, 1934),
which established the principle of exclusivity under the National Industrial Recovery Act:
This Board, therefore, stands upon the majority rule. And it does so the more will-
ingly because the rule is in accord with American political traditions of political de-
mocracy, which empower representatives elected by a majority of the voters to speak
for all the people.
Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) at 43. See generally Weyand, 45 Colum L Rev at
561-64 (cited in note 110); Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 135 (cited in note 38).
115. Senator Wagner apparently entertained several ideas for multiple representation
of employees before finally concluding that exclusive representation was essential to the
strength and stability of collective bargaining. See Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner's
Act: Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the
National Labor Relations Act, 11 Indus Rel L J 73 (1989).
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Nevertheless, the rhetoric of workplace democracy did not lead
ineluctably to the Wagner Act model of representation or any
other particular means of translating the majority's will into
power. For example, "workplace democracy" may, but does not
necessarily contemplate the involvement of strong independent or
"outside" unions. Ironically, some of the earliest proponents of a
workplace democracy theory were not union leaders or supporters
at all, but were business leaders with no interest in strengthening
the role of independent unions. 116 Whether by design or accident,
the purveyors of this alternative strain of workplace democracy
adopted much the same rhetoric but with very different effect. One
management consultant, John Leitch, described industrial democ-
racy as "the organization of any factory or business institution into
a little democratic state with a representative government which
shall have both its legislative and executive phases. '117 His scheme
called for a "house of representatives" elected by the employees, a
"senate" of foremen and union executives, and a "cabinet" of com-
pany executives."'
Management-initiated employee representation schemes began
to appear in America at the beginning of the twentieth century as
a means of boosting employee morale or as a "substitute" for tradi-
tional union organization. The growth of employee representation
gained momentum during the early days of the New Deal as indus-
trialists sought to create an alternative to government-supported
independent unionism. While the plans gave the appearance of de-
mocracy, they were naturally dependent for their very existence
upon the will of the employer. Thus, representatives were ulti-
mately accountable to management, rather than vice versa, and
this fact severely limited the forcefulness with which representa-
tives could assert any participatory authority over the work-
place. 19 Early experiments in government-mandated representa-
116. See generally Raymond L. Hogler, Worker Participation, Employer Anti-Union-
ism, and Labor Law: The Case of the Steel Industry, 1918-1937, 7 Hofstra Labor L J 1, 4-
23 (1989); Don D. Lescohier, "Employee Representation" or "Company Unions?" in IV His-
tory of Labor in the United States 336 (1935); Valerie Jean Connor, The National War
Labor Board 14-15, 109-11 (1983).
117. John Leitch, Industrial Government 70 (1921), quoted in Lescohier, "Employee
Representation" or "Company Unions?" in IV History of Labor in the United States at 336
(cited in note 116).
118. Id.
119. See generally Lescohier, "Employee Representation" or "Company Unions?" in
IV History of Labor in the United States at 336 (cited in note 116); Connor, The National
War Labor Board at 110-11 (cited in note 116).
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tion plans do not appear to have fared any better.120
Even assuming that independent unionism is a key to workplace
democracy, it still does not follow that employees must elect a sin-
gle exclusive representative to deal with an employer. Arguably,
the exclusion of minority representation is anti-democratic. 121 A
more democratic form of majority rule might be achieved by a
"proportional" representation analogous to the election of a legis-
lature or parliament in a political democracy. In a system of pro-
portional representation, several unions or "parties" may represent
workers in a panel or committee of representatives. The number of
representatives from each union is proportionate to that union's
share of the vote.
Proportional representation may result in the creation of an bar-
gaining entity separate from the unions from which representatives
might be drawn. Alternatively, each union can act on its own be-
half in multi-party negotiations without the creation of a separate
but unifying panel of labor representatives. Multi-party bargaining
of this sort is not based on an electoral test of strength, but it is
still proportional in the sense that each union's bargaining power is
determined by its membership strength and ability to lead an ef-
fective strike.
Before the Wagner Act, proportional representation was not un-
known in the United States, but for reasons discussed below the
American labor movement reacted strongly against proportional
representation and in favor of exclusive representation. In con-
trast, in many European nations including France
22 and Italy,123
some variation of proportional representation remains a preferred
basis for collective bargaining.
Proportional or multi-union representation has a number of vir-
tues, but it is not a very effective system for collective bargaining
and it can be used by an employer to defeat legitimate bargaining.
120. The earliest experiment in government-mandated employee representation plans
was by the War Labor Board during World War I. See notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
Another equally short-lived experiment occured under the Roosevelt Administration in the
early days of the New Deal, when the Administration brokered a settlement of a major labor
dispute in the automobile industry by sanctioning proportional representation schemes. See
Sidney Fine, Proportional Representation of Workers in the Auto Industry, 12 Indus &
Labor Rel Rev 182 (1959). See also notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
121. Precisely this argument was made by early industrial unions in the railroad in-
dustry, where "majority rule" typically pointed toward a hegemony of established craft un-
ions. Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 288-89, 296-97 (cited in note 25).
122. Kennedy, European Labor Relations 50-51, 57 (cited in note 4).
123. Id at 91-93, 102.
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During the formative years of American labor policy in the 1930s,
some employers favored proportional representation as a last-ditch
defense against independent unions. Typically, these employers
had formed "company unions" or employee representation plans
that were management-dominated and provided only the illusion
of collective bargaining.12' So long as a company union had the
support of at least a bare majority of employees, the employer
could dismiss the entreaties of an outside union on the basis of
"majority rule." Even if the outside union achieved majority sup-
port, the employer could still refuse to bargain directly with the
union or its "outside" agents and could continue to deal directly
with elected employees who were ultimately accountable to
management. 25
There are other dangers of employer manipulation of a propor-
tional representation scheme. When more than one union has the
right to represent the same group of employees, employer discrimi-
nation is likely to be a recurring problem. Even if multi-union bar-
gaining necessarily leads to a single set of terms for all employees,
there are many ways an employer can favor one union or its leader-
ship at the expense of other unions. Not surprisingly, in countries
such as Japan where multi-union representation is common, em-
ployer discrimination between unions is one of the most serious
problems facing unions and labor law officials. 2 '
Proportional representation also complicates the bargaining pro-
cess because of the intrusion of so many different voices. While
proportional representation may be suitable for legislating or mak-
ing final policy decisions, negotiating is quite a different process.
An assortment of unions or parties presumably will have different
agendas and different priorities. Rarely will it be possible to
achieve all things for all persons, and sometimes what one group
wants cannot possibly be granted without denying some benefit to
124. See James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board: A
Study in Economics, Politics, and the Law 23-25 (1974); Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB
(Old) at 41-42.
125. See Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) at 41-42. See also Bok, 84 Harv L
Rev at 1434-35 (cited in note 15).
126. In Japan, for example, employer discrimination against militant unions and in
favor of more compliant ones is a leading source of unfair labor practice complaints. See
Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law at 56-57, 82-83 (cited in note 4). "Major-
ity" unions tend to receive considerable support from employers, at least until they take too
assertive a position. Employers then routinely throw their support to another union, which
quickly becomes the new "majority" union. See Tadashi Hanami, Labor Relations in Japan
Today 54-57, 69, 92, 135-36 (1979).
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another group. Thus, in multi-union negotiations, negotiations be-
tween rival unions may be as important as negotiations with the
employer.
12 7
A single or exclusive representative ordinarily resolves such con-
flicts before it reaches the bargaining table. Exclusivity simplifies
the bargaining process by channeling employee wants into a single
voice. Without exclusivity, employee factions would inevitably
make conflicting proposals and demands. Instead of accommodat-
ing or reconciling their demands between themselves, the employ-
ees might well leave it to the employer to resolve the deadlock.
Exclusivity transfers much of this reponsibility to a union, which
must find a way of reconciling conflicting employee demands
before they are presented to the employer.
The difficulty of multi-union bargaining is reflected in the scope
of agreements that typically result from such bargaining. French
"workers' councils," for example, which provide a system of pro-
portional representation, are mainly consultative bodies with very
little actual bargaining power. True bargaining occurs mainly at
the national or industry-wide level between the major union feder-
ations and employer associations, and this bargaining results in the
establishment of "minimum" wages and only a few other basic
terms of employment.12 s In comparison, agreements negotiated by
American unions acting as exclusive representatives are quite de-
tailed and settle many matters about the workplace beyond the
core issues of wages and benefits.
Why, then, is proportional or multi-union representation the ba-
sis for bargaining in so many other industrialized countries? First,
the practical difficulties of multi-union bargaining may be greatly
lessened in systems dominated by nation-wide or industry-wide
bargaining in which the national government is at least an unoffi-
cial party. Contractual bargaining in such systems may be far less
important than legislative and political action.
127. See generally Treu, 7 Comp Labor L at 231-33 (cited in note 4).
128. Kennedy, European Labor Relations at 48-51, 57 (cited in note 4); Bok, 84 Harv
L Rev at 1432-38 (cited in note 15). Similarly, collective bargaining in Italy and Germany
occurs mainly at the national or industry level. Local unions are relatively weak and collec-
tive bargaining agreements are relatively simple and limited in scope. Kennedy, European
Labor Relations at 91-92, 175-78 (cited in note 4). See also Hanami, Labor Relations in
Japan Today at 52-54 (cited in note 126), describing collective bargaining in Japan, where
agreements are quite vague and resemble more a commitment to consult in good faith than
an American-style collective bargaining agreement. However, this difference between Ameri-
can and Japanese labor agreements may be due more to cultural differences than to differ-
ences in the system of employee representation.
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Second, employee freedom of choice in union affiliation is of
greater importance in many other nations than in the United
States. The chief virtues of multi-union representation are that it
amplifies the voice of minority employees and gives each employee
a sense of choice. It may even be essential to allow employees a
choice among different unions when an employee's choice has spe-
cial political or religious significance, as it does in many other na-
tions that permit multi-union bargaining. 129 In France and Italy,
for example, most unions are extensions of major political parties,
and membership is an act of support for a party and its program.
To appoint a "majority" union to be the "exclusive" representative
in such a case would have political repurcussions far beyond the
question of collective versus individual bargaining.
Even so, the labor laws, institutions or cultures of many indus-
trialized nations have developed various substitutes for a legal doc-
trine of exclusivity in order to simplify the bargaining process.130
In Japan, for example, the right to bargain through a "minority"
representative may mean much less in actual practice than in legal
theory, because an employee typically becomes a member of a
"majority union" by virtue of his employment (in other words, he
must take some special action to avoid or change union member-
ship) and the social pressure to conform is sufficiently strong to
prevent most employees from joining minority unions.1 3 ' The avail-
ability of alternative union representation may actually be most
valuable to employers who use multi-union representation to keep
union militancy in check.
32
In the United States, there were no compelling reasons to pre-
serve the opportunity for multi-union representation. Very few
modern American unions represent a particular political ideology,
and no unions are directly linked with either of the two major po-
litical parties. For most of this century the American labor move-
ment has followed a common theme in pragmatic "business union-
ism." American unions are primarily interested in private
workplace bargaining; political agendas are of secondary concern.
129. See Treu, 7 Comp Labor L at 231 (cited in note 4); Kennedy, European Labor
Relations at 46-48, 87 (cited in note 4) (France, Italy); Hanami, Labor Relations in Japan
Today at 92 (cited in note 126); Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law at 8-9
(cited in note 4).
130. See, for example, Kennedy, European Labor Relations at 8 (cited in note 4),
describing Great Britain's drift toward exclusive representation.
131. Hanami, Labor Relations in Japan Today at 137 (cited in note 126).
132. Id at 54-57, 69, 92, 135-36.
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The most important issue fought between competing American un-
ions has involved the comparatively technical choice between
"craft" units and "industrial" units as a basis for bargaining. 133
While this issue once deeply split the labor movement, it was
largely defused by legislative compromises and the merger of the
chief antagonists, the American Federation of Labor and the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations. In any event, an employee's deci-
sion whether to favor a "craft" or "industrial" representative is a
matter of bargaining strategy rather than political or religious
outlook.
Given that multi-union representation was relatively unimpor-
tant in the United States and that private, local bargaining was the
preferred strategy for American unions, exclusive representation
offered a logical solution to many of the American labor move-
ment's problems. On the other hand, the adoption of an exclusive
representation scheme spawned other divisive and enervating is-
sues of "industrial democracy" for the American labor movement.
Assuming that exclusive representation is best for collective "bar-
gaining," what authority should exclusivity entail? What is to pre-
vent a union from oppressing minority groups or individual em-
ployees? While the creation of a legal doctrine of exclusivity was
one of the labor movement's most important achievements, exclu-
sivity provoked a powerful individualist counter-reaction that suc-
cessfully limited the power of unions and generated new issues to
divide the labor movement and strengthen opposition to unions.
A much greater problem in the long run, however, was that the
industrial democracy theory favored by independent unions re-
quired localized majority rule as the legitimizing force for a union's
exercise of exclusive authority to represent employees in bargain-
ing. If unions believed they would prevail in most elections by
mere logic and reason, they were certainly mistaken. Majority rule
was preferable to coercion, but it ultimately failed to provide the
labor movement with a key to much wider organization of Ameri-
can workers.
E. Exclusivity as a Legal Doctrine
The theory of industrial democracy offered an appealing basis
for the legitimate exercise of exclusive representative power, but
employer resistance to collective bargaining required a rule of law
133. See Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 141-45, 150 (cited in note 38).
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to put the theory into action. Thus, while many union leaders of
the early twentieth century distrusted any government interven-
tion, their needs for legally enforceable powers of exclusivity and
other protection ultimately pushed them back to the legislative
arena. The Wagner Act of 1935 went far in satisfying these needs,
in part by creating the modern-day doctrine of exclusivity.
Today, the Wagner Act's style of exclusive representation is
among the least controversial aspects of American labor law. Or-
ganized labor remains strongly committed to exclusive representa-
tion as the basis for collective bargaining, and even employers
often find that exclusivity works to their benefit as well as to a
union's. T3 In the years preceding and immediately following the
Wagner Act, however, the issue of exclusivity was a principal bat-
tleground in the struggle to gain government endorsement and
support for collective bargaining. Forces opposed to collective bar-
gaining targeted exclusivity as a weak leg in labor's legislative
agenda. For supporters of collective bargaining, the business estab-
lishment's focused attack against exclusivity confirmed exclusiv-
ity's importance.
A legal doctrine of exclusivity was not wholly unprecedented
before the Wagner Act. The federal government's limited and oc-
casional interventions in labor/management relations before the
New Deal era had at least revealed exclusivity as an issue.1 5 Nine-
teenth century legislators who drafted and debated the first labor
dispute bills had also anguished over the application of union/
management dispute settlements to nonunion workers. 3 It was
134. See, for example, Emporium Capwell Co. v Western Addition Community Org.,
420 US 50 (1975), where an employer invoked the rule of exclusivity in defense of its dis-
charge of employees whose concerted activities tended to undermine collective bargaining
between the employer and the majority labor organization.
135. During the late nineteenth century the American Railway Union, an early "indus-
trial" labor organization, competed for members with older trade union brotherhoods. In a
series of conflicts that included the Pullman strike, the brotherhoods invoked "majority
rule" against the ARU's efforts to command industry-wide cooperation, because the ARU
usually lacked majority support among groups of skilled railway employees. When Congress
first debated a proposal to provide binding arbitration in railway disputes between labor
and the railroads, the question naturally arose as to which union would have the right to
"represent" employees in an arbitration. The brotherhoods proposed representation on the
basis of "majority support" within the affected "craft." See Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at
247-55 (cited in note 25). See also notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
136. Some early state legislation provided for consensual mediation and arbitration of
labor disputes without any clear or effective answer to the problem of applying a union's
settlement to nonunion employees. Typical labor dispute legislation provided that a union
and the employer would select the arbitrator if the affected employees were members of the
union, but if the affected employees were nonunion they would elect a representative who,
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the early federal "labor boards" of the twentieth century, however,
that provided the first clear focus on the problem.
The federal government's institutionalized involvement in collec-
tive bargaining beyond the railroad industry began in earnest dur-
ing World War I, when President Wilson established the National
War Labor Board (hereinafter "the NWLB") to mediate labor dis-
putes that might disrupt the war effort. 3 7 To labor leaders,
America's involvement in World War I was an important opportu-
nity to advance their own recipe for "industrial democracy." Bor-
rowing from President Wilson's call for an end to "autocracy," la-
bor leaders stepped up their campaign to "democratize" the
workplace through the building of independent unions and collec-
tive bargaining. 3 8
By its creation of the NWLB, the Wilson administration tacitly
acknowledged the strategic importance of labor unions and the re-
spectability of their platform of industrial democracy. By assuming
the role of mediator, the government necessarily "recognized and
affirmed" a "right of workers to organize in trade-unions and to
bargain collectively through chosen representatives. s1
But who were the "chosen" representatives? While some board
members of the NWLB, such as Joint Chairman Frank Walsh, saw
the Board as an opportunity to elevate the role of independent un-
ions, 40 the Board's immediate and often compromising purpose
was to prevent labor disputes from interfering with war-time pro-
duction.1 4 ' For the most part it accomplished this goal by main-
taining the status quo, preventing either labor or management
from seizing unfair advantages created by the war and by investi-
gating and mediating disputes rather than creating enduring new
with the employer, would select the arbitrator. See, for example, 1892 NJ Laws 238; 1895
Tex Gen Laws 815.
In the congressional debate leading to the Erdman Act, opponents of binding arbitration
argued that Congress could not empower an arbitrator to order striking employees to return
to work, especially if some employees were not members or supporters of the "representa-
tive" in the arbitration. The final version of the law provided that nonmembers could not be
compelled to return to work without individual consent to the arbitration. See Schreiber, 25
Rutgers L Rev at 252-57 (cited in note 25).
137. See generally, Connor, The National War Labor Board (cited in note 116).
138. Connor, The National War Labor Board at 108-09 (cited in note 116).
139. National War Labor Board, Principles and Rules of Procedure 4, quoted in
Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) at 41.
140. See generally Connor, The National War Labor Board at 13-20 (cited in note
116).





The Board's approach to the appointment of representatives re-
flected these limitations. If a union had a pre-existing bargaining
relationship with an employer before seeking the Board's assis-
tance, the Board restored or preserved the relationship by ordering
the employer's recognition of and bargaining with the union. 142 A
union's status as the "representative" of the employees in such a
case was based not on evidence of "democratic" and uncoerced ma-
jority support but on the strength of past practice.
The Board was also important in encouraging collective bargain-
ing in previously nonunion workshops, but the Board's brand of
employee representation was fundamentally different from the
scheme preferred by labor leaders. The NWLB established its ba-
sic pattern for the historically nonunion environment in its West-
ern Union, Bethlehem Steel and General Electric proceedings:1 43
when employees sought the Board's assistance in establishing col-
lective bargaining in a nonunion setting, the Board conducted an
election of individual "employee representatives" to c6nstitute a
"shop committee" to deal with management.1 44 The employer owed
a duty to bargain with the committee of employees. On the other
hand, even if substantially all employees or "representatives" were
members of a union, the employer owed no duty to recognize or
bargain with the union.
1 45
Unions initially supported the Board's actions as an inroad to
traditional bargaining by a single and exclusive independent
union.146 Conversely, employers first worried that shop committees
would be the springboard for organization by "outside" unions. If
union members won all or most of a committee's positions, an em-
ployer's duty to bargain with the committee might, in practical ef-
fect, require bargaining with the union itself. Western Union, for
example, fought the Board's approach so tenaciously that Presi-
142. See, for example, Bureau of Applied Economics, 1 National War Labor Board
Docket, nos 16, 32, 53 (1919). See also Robert P. Reeder, Analysis of the Awards of the
National War Labor Board, 5 Bureau of Applied Economics (1919).
143. See Connor, The National War Labor Board at 35-49, 111-25 (cited in note 116).
144. See, for example, Bureau of Applied Economics, 1 National War Labor Board
Docket, nos 19, 21. See also National Labor Board, Procedure: Elections of Shop Commit-
tees, reprinted in 5 Bureau of Applied Economics (cited in note 142).
145. See, for example, 5 Bureau of Applied Economics, National War Labor Board
Docket nos 106, 154 (cited in note 142).
146. See Connor, The National War Labor Board at 35-49 (cited in note 116); Selig




dent Wilson was finally moved to nationalize the telegraph indus-
try.14, 7 Other employers, however, quickly learned that shop com-
mittees were not only easily manipulated and controlled, but also
useful to forestall the establishment of strong independent un-
ions.148 Some employers adopted representation plans even without
an order by the Board, and in the peacetime years following the
Board's dissolution, representation committees spread rapidly
among nonunion employers as a favorite anti-union technique. For
unions, employee representation schemes became synonymous with
"company unions" and imitation bargaining. 149
Other wartime labor regulators also struggled with issues of rep-
resentation and exclusivity. The Railroad Administration, which
was responsible for the management of the nation's railroads dur-
ing the federal government's brief nationalization of that industry,
encouraged collective bargaining with "majority" representatives
frequently identified by government-conducted elections. Govern-
ment regulation of wages and other terms of employment limited
the effect and purpose of "bargaining," but unions played a more
important role in the administration of grievance systems. 150 All
employees were entitled to present their own grievances, whether
they were affiliated with a "majority" or "minority" union, and
even if they were affiliated with no union at all, but control of the
processing of grievances was lodged securely with the majority
union. 151
The Railroad Administration's approach to majority rule and ex-
clusivity set the stage for controversy once the Armistice had re-
moved the need either for government control or wartime solidar-
ity. Many in the labor movement had hoped that nationalization of
the railroads might be permanent. 152 Instead, unions scored a
much more modest legislative victory with the Transportation Act
of 1920.'5s Railroads returned to private control, but the Act cre-
147. See Connor, The National War Labor Board at 43-47 (cited in note 116).
148. Perlman & Taft, Labor Movements in 4 History of Labour in the United States
at 409-10 (cited in note 146).
149. Id. See also Robert L. Filipelli, The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial
Relations, in United States Labor Relations, 1945-1989: Accomodation and Conflict 150
(Bruce Nissen, ed, 1990); Bok, 84 Harv L Rev at 1434-35 (cited in note 15).
150. See Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 260-62 (cited in note 25); Perlman & Taft,
Labor Movements in 4 History of Labour in the United States at 407-08 (cited in note 146).
151. Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 260-62 (cited in note 25).
152. Perlman & Taft, Labor Movements in 4 History of Labour in the United States
at 408 (cited in note 146).
153. Ch 91, 41 Stat 456 (1920). The Act lacked any enforcement provisions. It relied
on nothing more than public opinion to force compliance with the Railway Labor Board's
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ated a Railroad Labor Board, an important though weak precusor
of later-day labor boards. This early labor board inherited the
pent-up issues framed in wartime by the Railroad Administration.
The Transportation Act authorized the Board to hold confer-
ences between management and "representatives designated and
authorized to confer. . . by the employees.. . .,15" This mandate
to identify "designated and authorized" representatives was funda-
mentally vague. It failed even to indicate whether '"representa-
tives" could be nonemployees or unions independent of the in-
creasingly popular employee representation plans, although the
new Board quickly resolved this issue in favor of the unions.155
Beyond the question of who was qualified to represent employ-
ees, the Act provoked other three-way battles between the rail-
roads, craft unions, and generally "minority" industrial unions.
Under the Railroad Administration, employees in particular crafts
had exercised "majority rule" in nationwide, multi-employer units.
Naturally, well-established craft unions gained considerable power
under this system. The newly privatized railroads, however, now
argued that bargaining units should be no larger than carrier-wide
because the industry no longer operated under the centralized
management of the federal government. 15 Better yet, the railroads
argued, units should be divided into particular locations within
each of a carrier's systems. Of course, such localization of units
would not only have weakened the established unions' power, it
would also have eliminated union representation altogether in any
location where a union could not establish its majority status.
The craft unions argued for units embracing an entire railroad,
and ultimately the Railroad Labor Board compromised by holding
that craft units should be organized for each system of a rail-
road. 157 Nevertheless, the new system-wide units reduced the es-
tablished unions' hold by enabling some railroads to establish com-
pany-dominated unions for some systems. 158 System-wide units
judgments. When public opinion proved ineffective as an enforcement device, Congress re-
pealed the Transportation Act and replaced it with the Railway Labor Act in 1926, which
among other things granted real enforcement powers to the Board. Ch 347, 44 Stat 577
(1926).
154. Transportation Act of 1920, Section 301, 41 Stat at 469.
155. Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 279-80 (cited in note 25).
156. Id at 274-75.
157. International Ass'n of Machinists v Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2 US
Railroad Labor Board Decisions 87 (1921). See Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 272-74 (cited
in note 25).
158. Schreiber, 25 Rutgers L Rev at 279 (cited in note 25).
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were simultaneously too large for many small or marginal unions
that were unable to establish majority support except at particular
locations.
159
The Transportation Act's mandate for exclusivity was as vague
as its directions for the organization of bargaining units. Craft un-
ions argued in favor of complete exclusivity for majority unions in
the representation of employee interests. Industrial unions, search-
ing for a foothold to preserve their status in the craft-dominated
labor regime, argued for a division between "bargaining" functions
and "grievance" functions. As to the bargaining function, they con-
ceded the necessity of exclusivity for a majority (and most likely
craft) union. The Railroad Labor Board accepted this position and
held that exclusivity would be limited by the right of an individual
employee to present his grievance in person or by a representative
of his choice.
16 0
The Railroad Labor Board set new precedents for the doctrine of
exclusivity that ultimately would apply in varied form to labor re-
lations in other industries. Some of these precedents deepened di-
visions within the labor movement and offered employers new tools
for combatting independent unionism; but on the whole, labor
leaders found the new principles of majority rule and exclusivity
potentially uplifting for collective bargaining."6 "
The impetus for wider federal involvement in collective bargain-
ing came a decade later with the Great Depression and President
Roosevelt's New Deal initiative. While the Depression weakened
the economic power of unions, the apparent failure of individual-
ism and laissez faire economics had also strengthened the appeal of
friendly government involvement in labor relations. At the outset,
however, the labor movement's brand of "industrial democracy"
won only token support from the Administration. The overriding
issue for the Administration was how best to return the nation to
prosperity. Thus, the first New Deal measures for collective bar-
gaining and industrial democracy were symbolic gestures offered to
gain labor's moral support for a program that relied much more on
the support of business interests.162 Big business, on the other
159. Id at 282-83.
160. International Ass'n of Machinists, 2 US Railroad Labor Board Decisions at 96.
161. In the early years of the Roosevelt Administration, unions embraced the majority
rule and exclusivity principles of railway labor law as a model for a general law of labor
relations. See notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
162. While business interests were not a natural constituency for Roosevelt, business
opposition was a serious threat to the viability of any federal intervention to revive industry.
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hand, battled to prevent the extension of railway labor practices
into general industry, and they focused their efforts most intensely
against exclusive representation by independent unions.
The first New Deal collective bargaining legislation, contained in
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),'6" was a mere foot-
note to a larger plan of government-industry cooperation and in-
dustry self-regulation. e4 The Act provided for the development of
"codes" of fair competition to be drafted by employers collectively
in each industry and approved by a National Recovery Adminis-
tration (hereinafter "the NRA"). The NRA's mission was to ignite
an industrial recovery and so its Administrator, General Hugh
Johnson, tended to favor business interests in many issues of fun-
damental policy. In an important concession to labor, however,
Section 7(a) of the Act required each industry code to contain the
following "condition":
That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. .. .15
The NRA's endorsement of a right of employees to organize, se-
lect representatives, and bargain collectively was an important
symbol for labor, but standing alone Section 7(a) was little more
than an abstract statement of principle. It created no procedure
for the election of representatives, did not clearly assure the right
of independent or "outside" unions to represent employees, and
provided no clear basis for a doctrine of exclusive representation.
To the contrary, some employers plausibly interpreted Section 7(a)
to condone company unions and even to prohibit exclusive repre-
sentation by outside unions.""
The Administration therefore was keenly aware of its need for the cooperation of industrial-
ists, and it was equally aware of the constitutional shoals that lay ahead of any heavy regu-
lation of business or labor relations. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations
Board at 3 (cited in note 124).
163. Ch 90, 48 Stat 195 (1933).
164. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 7-11 (cited in
note 124).
165. 48 Stat at 198.
166. Section 7(a) provided that employees were free to select representatives, but it
did not specify whether this was to be done by the employees collectively or individually,
nor did it clearly establish a role for independent unions. Employers and their advocates
frequently argued a system of exclusive representation by an outside union would have con-
stituted "interference" with an individual employee's right to his own representative. See
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The Administration's efforts to give substance to Section 7(a)
was mired in bitter fighting between the NRA's Labor Advisory
Board and the generally pro-business Industrial Advisory Board.1
6 7
As a result, the NRA's interpretive actions were frequently incon-
sistent and usually reflected less reasoned analysis than the shift-
ing balance of power between labor and management within the
Administration and within particular industries subject to the
NRA's jurisidiction. For example, the NRA first seemed to decide
against exclusive representation, pronouncing that "employers...
can make collective bargains with organized employees, or individ-
ual bargains with those who choose to act individually."' 8 Yet the
NRA later required soft coal mine operators to delete an "individ-
ual bargaining" provision from their industry code. 69
However the NRA interpreted Section 7(a), there was little to
prevent an employer from disregarding code provisions the em-
ployer found unsuitable. Many employers refused to bargain with
any outside or independent union on any basis. Thus, far from al-
leviating labor unrest, Section 7(a) had the effect of provoking bat-
tle between labor and management. The months following the en-
actment of Section 7(a) were shaken by a nearly unprecedented
wave of strikes as unions used Section 7(a) as a new symbol in
their wars for recognition.
°7 0
This first wave of labor disputes over Section 7(a) set the pat-
tern of regulatory advance, employer resistance, labor unrest, and
further regulatory advance that characterized New Deal labor law
development. In response to the first wave of unrest, President
Roosevelt announced the creation of a National Labor Board
(hereinafter "the NLB") to "consider, adjust and settle [labor-
management] differences and controversies" over Section 7(a).'
Cornelius Wickersham, The NIRA from the Employer's Viewpoint, 48 Harv L Rev 954, 973
(1935); Minier Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining under Section 7(a), 29 Ill L
Rev 275 (1934); Hogler, 7 Hofstra Labor L J at 23-24 (cited in note 116). See also United
States v Weirton Steel Co., 10 F Supp 55 (D Del 1935) (agreeing that Section 7(a) did not
prohibit an employer's representation plan).
167. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 12-15 (cited in
note 124).
168. See id at 13-14, quoting NRA Release No 463.
169. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 14 (cited in
note 124).
170. See id at 108-09.
171. See id at 15 n 31, quoting Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor on S 2926: A Bill to Equalize the Bargaining Power of Employers and Employees,
to Encourage the Amicable Settlement of Disputes Between Employers and Employees, to
Create a National Labor Board, and for Other Purposes, 73rd Cong, 2d Sess, part I, 39-40.
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The President directed the NLB to mediate disputes between la-
bor and management, but mediation failing, the NLB lacked any
sure power to impose a settlement on the parties. 17 2 Its small, over-
worked and inexperienced staff of nine was all-consumed by the
need for quick resolution of an overwhelming number of strikes
and it had little time to develop broad, substantive policies for em-
ployee representation. 17 3 Moreover, many employers were hostile
to the NLB, which they perceived to be pro-labor. Dependent on
voluntary employer cooperation, the NLB reacted indecisively to
employer resistance.
17 4
While the NLB shrank from substantive issues, the National Re-
covery Administration continued to issue controversial labor policy
decisions in its review of industry codes. Under the increasing sway
of business interests, the NRA concluded that Section 7(a) permit-
ted minority and proportional representation, and even individual
bargaining, in tandem with collective bargaining.1
7 5
These encroachments by the NRA threatened to preempt any
substantive policy-making by the NLB, especially with regard to
systems of employee representation. To preserve its role, and to
gain the higher ground on the issue of exclusivity, the NLB per-
suaded President Roosevelt to issue a new Executive Order con-
In haste to respond to the deepening economic crisis, President Roosevelt established the
NLB without a formal executive order, and thus at the outset its power and duration were
dubious. Several months later President Roosevelt "approved and ratified all actions hereto-
fore taken by this Board in the discharge of its functions." Executive Order No 6511 (Dec
16, 1933).
172. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 109-12 (cited in note 38); Gross, The
Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 17 (cited in note 124). If the NLB was
finally required to impose a settlement, and either party refused to comply, the NLB could
refer the matter to the National Recovery Administration's Compliance Division. The Na-
tional Recovery Administration, however, was often unfriendly and in complete disagree-
ment with the NLB's policy-making decisions. Id at 35-38, 54-55.
173. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 19-20 (cited in note
124). In addition, the development of substantive policy was restricted by the nature of the
Board's composition. Its seven members included three partisan management representa-
tives, three partisan labor representatives, and Senator Robert Wagner, the chairman and
lone nonpartisan member. Senator Wagner was eager to avoid controversy, and thus he em-
phasized the Board's mediation function over its policy-making function. Id at 26-32.
174. Id at 42-43, 45-52. One important practice the Board developed in its negotiated
settlement of strikes was to provide a Board-supervised secret ballot election to determine
whether the employees desired the representation of a union. Id at 20-22; Tomlins, The
State and the Unions at 113-14 (cited in note 38).
175. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 33-34 (cited in note
124). The National Recovery Administration also briefly battled with the Labor Board for
the responsibility to mediate local labor disputes. The NRA, under pressure from its own
Labor Advisory Board and Senator Wagner's threat to resign from the NLB, finally deferred
to the NLB's jurisdiction over mediation. Id.
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firming the principle of "majority rule" in the selection of bargain-
ing representatives and authorizing the NLB to "make the
arrangements for and supervise the conduct of an election" where
representation was in dispute.
1
71
While the Order did not clearly endorse any particular system of
representation for achieving "majority rule," it did place responsi-
bility for the management of elections squarely with the NLB. In
National Lock Co., 17 one of the first NLB decisions after the Pres-
ident's new authorization, the Board held that an employer had
violated the rights of its employees by devising its own employee
representation plan and conducting an election where the em-
ployer's purpose was to prevent representation by an outside
union. "Organization and representation are matters which con-
cern employees exclusively," the Board commented, and it directed
an election to determine the employees' real "representatives."
Still the Board's National Lock order begged the question
whether representation should be exclusive or proportional, or by
some other scheme. In fact, the members of the Board were split as
to how majority rule should be achieved. Senator Wagner and la-
bor members of the Board supported the view that employee rights
and bargaining power would best be protected by majority rule
leading to the selection of a single representative. Employer mem-
bers favored approval of proportional representation and em-
ployer-created employee representation committees. 178 The em-
ployer members had a powerful ally in NRA Administrator
Johnson, who was already reassuring employers that the Executive
Order did not prevent minority representation or even individual
bargaining.
17 9
Senator Wagner, of course, was the deciding vote on the NLB,
and in Denver Tramway Corp.5 0 and Houde Engineering Co.' 85
176. Executive Order 6580 (Feb 1, 1934). See generally Gross, The Making of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board at 54-56 (cited in note 124). The Order also granted the NLB
a measure of enforcement power by denying the NIRA's Compliance Division authority to
review the NLB's findings.
177. 1 National Labor Board 15 (1934).
178. See, for example, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and La-
bor on S 2926: A Bill to Equalize the Bargaining Power of Employers and Employees, to
Encourage the Amicable Settlement of Disputes Between Employers and Employees, to
Create a National Labor Board, and for Other Purposes, 73rd Cong, 2d Sess, part I at 400-
02 (statement of Henry Dennison); Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 114 (cited in note
38).
179. NRA Release No 3125 (Feb 4, 1934), quoted in Gross, The Making of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board at 56 (cited in note 124).
180. 1 National Labor Board Decisions 64 (Mar 1, 1934).
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the Board conclusively held that the representative elected by a
majority of the employees would represent all employees. Further,
the Board held an employer had not satisfied its duty toward a
majority union by submitting a proposed labor agreement applica-
ble to union members only.
While the NLB's election orders for these cases were clear en-
dorsements of exclusivity, employer members and other represent-
atives of industry continued to work behind the scenes in opposi-
tion to exclusive representation. 182 They very nearly turned the
tide. No sooner had the Board issued its Denver Tramway and
Houde Engineering decisions than the Roosevelt Administration
backpedaled toward proportional and minority bargaining. To me-
diate a labor dispute in the automobile industry, the President ap-
pointed a key opponent of exclusivity, none other than National
Recovery Administrator Johnson.""s The settlement Johnson
brokered established a system of "pluralism" through proportional
representation. Anticipating the NLB's opposition, Johnson's set-
tlement agreement precluded NLB supervision of automobile in-
dustry elections and created a separate Automobile Labor
Board.184
In announcing the settlement, President Roosevelt lauded the
"equitable system" of employee representation "in which all
groups of employees, whatever may be their choice of organization
or form of representation, may participate . ... 'I" Management
and labor alike viewed the announcement and underlying settle-
ment as fatal blows to the NLB's authority and the doctrine of
exclusive representation." 6 Employers in Denver Tramway, Houde
181. 1 National Labor Board Decisions 87 (Mar 8, 1934).
182. Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 115 (cited in note 38).
183. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 61 (cited in note
124).
184. Id at 61 n 99.
185. Reprinted in 78 Cong Rec 5384 (Mar 26, 1934).
186. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 60-72 (cited in note
124); Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S 2926: A Bill to
Equalize the Bargaining Power of Employers and Employees, to Encourage the Amicable
Settlement of Disputes Between Employers and Employees, to Create a National Labor
Board, and for Other Purposes, 73rd Cong, 2d Sess, part I, 497-98 (Statement of Henry
Harriman).
The Automobile Settlement also had the effect of derailing Senator Wagner's promotion
of the Labor Disputes Bill, which would have created a new Labor Board with more effec-
tive enforcement powers. Senator Wagner reluctantly agreed to a compromise in Public Res-
olution No 44, which also created a new Labor Board but lacked the teeth of the Labor




Engineering and other cases before the Board were emboldened in
their defiance of the Board's orders. They were encouraged by
knowledge that enforcement of NLB orders was in the hands of
the NRA and Justice Department, which appeared unlikely to take
action on any order resting on exclusivity. s7 A new wave of labor
unrest followed as union leaders abandoned hope that the NLB
could establish a new regime of collective bargaining law. 8
This second wave of labor unrest forced the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration's next move forward in the development of a federal law of
collective bargaining. The Administration forged yet another com-
promise in Public Resolution Numiber 44, authorizing the Presi-
dent to create new and somewhat more powerful labor boards to
replace the NLB. s9 Public Resolution No. 44 authorized the new
boards to conduct elections, but omitted an express endorsement
of exclusivity.
If the Resolution provided for elections, did it endorse exclusive
representation by implication? The President, whose support for
exclusivity was uncertain at best after the automobile settlement,
added yet another element of ambiguity in a pair of executive or-
ders implementing the Resolution. In one, creating a separate Na-
tional Steel Labor Relations Board, the President specifically di-
rected that "the person, persons, or organizations certified as the
choice of the majority of those voting shall be accepted as the bar-
gaining representatives of said employees for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining. "'0 In the other, which he issued the following day,
he established the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter
"the NLRB"), authorized to conduct representation elections but
without an express mandate to require exclusive representation by
a majority union. 19'
Arguably, the omission of an express rule of exclusivity for the
NLRB was an implicit rejection, especially when viewed in the
187. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 60, 63, 90-91 (cited
in note 124).
188. Id at 62.
189. 48 Stat 1183 (1934). In response, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No
6763 (June 29, 1934), abolishing the NLB and creating the first NLRB. See generally Gross,
The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 69-72 (cited in note 124).
190. Executive Order No 6751 (June 28, 1934). See also a Railway Labor Act amend-
ment which Congress enacted one week earlier, expressly requiring majority rule in the se-
lection of employee representatives. Act of June 21, 1934, Section 2, Pub L No 73-441, 48
Stat 1185, 1187. Congress' specific provision for majority rule in this legislation added some
weight to the argument that Congress' omission of such a provision in Resolution No 44 was
an implicit rejection of majority rule for non-railroad employee relations.
191. Executive Order No 6763 (June 29, 1934).
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light of the President's directions to the National Steel Labor Re-
lations Board. The NLRB moved quickly to resolve the uncer-
tainty by reopening proceedings against the Houde Engineering
Company (which had refused to comply with the NLB's finding
that a majority union was the exclusive representative).
In this second Houde Engineering Co. 192 decision, the NLRB
drew upon the precedents of the early Railroad Labor Board to
give its unyielding support for the principle of exclusive represen-
tation.19 The employer in Houde had argued in favor of propor-
tional representation through a "composite committee" of elected
representatives from competing unions. The Board conceded that
this scheme would "on its face be just and democratic." But a com-
mittee with proportional representation, the Board continued,
would still act by majority rule within the committee. "Hence the
majority representatives would still control, and the only difference
between this and the traditional method of bargaining with the
majority alone would be that the suggestions of the minority would
be advanced in the presence of the majority." This process of de-
bate and decision-making, while facially democratic, would breed
"dissension and rivalry" destructive to the collective bargaining
process. The Board concluded "that the only interpretation of Sec-
tion 7(a) which can give effect to its purposes is that the represent-
atives of the majority should constitute the exclusive agency for




The Board also anticipated some important issues about the lim-
its of exclusivity. It rejected as unfounded the fear that exclusivity
would lead inevitably to the formation of closed or union shops. A
majority union's exclusive power over negotiations and contract
formation would suffice to make collective bargaining effective.
1 9 5
Thus, the Board reassured, a union's exclusive right to represent
employees would not in itself compel employees to join the union
or submit to its membership obligations. At most, the creation of a
"closed shop" would be a matter for negotiation between a major-
ity union and an employer and would not follow as a matter of
law.196
192. 1 NLRB (Old) 38 (Aug 30, 1934).
193. The NLRB also cited the practices of the National War Labor Board (NWLB),
but in fact the NWLB's position on exclusivity was not very supportive. See notes 142-49
and accompanying text.
194. Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) at 39-40.
195. See also note 18 and accompanying text.
196. Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB (Old) at 35, 43 (Aug 30, 1934).
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The Board also acknowledged the potential for an exclusive rep-
resentative's abuse of rights of individuals or minority groups, but
it declined to specify what remedies were or ought to be available
to employees against unions. 197 Its immediate goal was to make
collective bargaining a practical and widely available option for
employees. The Board left it to later policymakers to find solutions
to the dangers of exclusivity.
The American Federation of Labor applauded Houde as "eco-
nomically sound, fair and just." 19 8 In contrast, employers quickly
condemned the decision. The National Manufacturers' Association,
for example, advised its members to ignore the NLRB. The true
state of the law, the Association maintained, was reflected in the
NRA's earlier rejection of exclusivity and in the President's ap-
proval of proportional representation in the automobile settlement.
Employers should disregard Houde, the Association advised, "until
competent judicial authority has passed on the ruling." '
Employers had many reasons to oppose the Board's doctrine, if
only because they were prone to oppose any rule of law that would
strengthen union bargaining power. Houde presented a major
threat to the viability of employee representation committees,
company-dominated unions and other devices employers used to
prevent the encroachment and entrenchment of independent un-
ions. But employers were unlikely to win support against the
Board by opposing "majority rule," which was an appealingly sim-
ple and American approach to decision-making. Rather, it was ex-
clusivity, especially in tandem with independent unionism, that
employers targeted. In attacking exclusivity, employer groups res-
urrected issues of individualism and economic liberty, and they re-
called that, traditionally, exclusive representation had been synon-
ymous with "closed" or "union" shops. 20 0 They offered company-
formed employee representation plans as a more "democratic"
alternative.2 °1
Elements within the Roosevelt Administration joined the oppo-
sition. Donald Richberg, General Counsel for the NRA, publicly
197. Id at 44. Another important question left unresolved was how the Board would
identify the "units" within which employees would practice majority rule. Id.
198. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 92-93 (cited in
note 124), quoting William Green, President, American Federation of Labor.
199. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 92-93 (cited in note
124).
200. See id at 96-97.
201. See Hearings on S 2926, 73d Cong, 2d Seas, part I at 337-489.
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disparaged the Houde decision 202 and fought an ongoing battle
with the NLRB over jurisdiction of other cases. 20 3 The Automobile
Labor Board, created as a result of the automobile settlement, con-
tinued to follow the principle of proportional representation.2 °4
Against these attacks the pro-labor majority of the NLRB stood
firm in their support for exclusive representation by majority rule.
They were motivated not only by their own notions of "industrial
democracy" but also by purely economic goals. Convinced of the
need to equalize power between employers and struggling unions,
they found in exclusivity a powerful tool for readjusting the bal-
ance. Given the weakened state of unions in the Great Depression,
the dangers exclusivity posed to individual economic liberty
seemed speculative and remote. If majority rule might eventually
lead to the oppression of individual liberty, policymakers could
deal with that problem if and when it became real.20 5
Like the National Labor Board before it, the first NLRB failed
for want of clear support from the President in recurring battles
with the NRA, and because of the Board's dependency on uncoop-
erative NRA and Justice Department officials in the enforcement
of Board decisions. 206 The Supreme Court's decision in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v United States207 was the final blow. In Schechter
the Court ruled that much of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, from which the NLB and first NLRB had sprouted, was
unconstitutional.
But Schechter Poultry also cleared the deck of early New Deal
misdirection, and it coincided with President Roosevelt's increas-
ing disillusionment with the industrialists and corporate interests
he had courted during the early New Deal.208 Until the Schecter
decision, Senator Wagner's efforts to enact stronger collective bar-
gaining legislation had languished without the support of the Ad-
ministration. With the NRA and the first NLRB virtually dead,
the President gave half-hearted but ultimately decisive support to
Senator Wagner's National Labor Relations Act bill to establish a
202. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 101-02 (cited
in note 124).
203. Id at 109-22.
204. Id at 101. See notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
205. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 96-97 (cited in note
124).
206. Id at 123-30.
207. 295 US 495 (1935).




permanent and far reaching collective bargaining law.209
Among the chief purposes of the Act was to reestablish the
handful of now largely unenforceable precedents set by the NIRA-
era labor boards,21 0 and Houde Engineering Co. was foremost
among the precedents it reaffirmed.211 The resulting statement of
exclusive representation now found in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is contained principally in Section 9(a):
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....212
The contours of the doctrine of exclusivity are further sculpted in
other provisions of the Act. Section 8(a)(5),13 for example, re-
quires an employer to bargain with a union that is an exclusive
representative. Section 8(a)(2)24 prohibits employers from domi-
nating or supporting unions-a clear repudiation of employee rep-
resentation plans and company unions.
The Act thus adopted collective bargaining as a favored way of
protecting employees and equalizing bargaining power, and it
adopted majority rule-based exclusivity as the scheme for collec-
tive bargaining. The then-competing alternative models, such as
company unionism and the employee representation plans offered
by employers, were banned. The Act did not absolutely foreclose
development of other models of employee representation-it
broadly declared the right of employees to engage in "concerted"
activity and to form "labor organizations," but the Act reserved
the most important rights, such as the right to bargain, for proven
"majority" representatives. It provided little role for minority un-
ions through "proportional" representation or any other means.1 5
209. Id at 143-48.
210. Id at 130-33.
211. Id at 136; Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S
1958, 74th Cong, 1st Sess, 43-44 (statement of Senator Robert Wagner); Hearings on S 2926,
73d Cong, 2d Sess, part I, 43-44 (statement of Senator Robert Wagner); 79 Cong Rec 2368
(Feb 21, 1935) (statement of Senator Robert Wagner).
212. NLRA, 29 USC § 159(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
213. 29 USC § 158(a)(5).
214. 29 USC § 158(a)(2).
215. At least a few early commentators wondered if the Act required bargaining with
minority representatives in the absence of a majority representative. Section 8(a)(5), they
observed, requires an employer to bargain with "the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to section 9(a)." The proviso "subject to section 9(a)," they reasoned, qualified an abso-
lute duty to bargain with "employee representatives," so that the establishment of a major-
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Its purposes, after all, were to establish a particular vision of em-
ployee bargaining, and to eliminate once and for all the threat of
company unionism and proportional representation.
Despite what the drafters might have thought was inescapably
clear language, the opponents of exclusivity succeeded for several
years to preserve some doubt as to the Act's effect. Their success
was due in part to early Board strategy in the enforcement of the
Act. When President Roosevelt signed the Act into law on July 5,
1935, its viability was dubious in the face of expected constitu-
tional challenges. The new NLRB was first preoccupied with this
concern.21 Its early enforcement was guided by the belief that the
first case to reach the United States Supreme Court would have to
present the best possible argument for the Act's constitutionality.
At the outset, therefore, the Board tended to avoid issues such as
exclusivity and majority rule, which had been especially controver-
sial for the early labor boards.1
By coincidence, the majority rule issue first arrived before the
Supreme Court by other carriage, namely the Railway Labor Act
(hereinafter "the RLA"). Federal regulation of collective bargain-
ing in the railroad industry was of more certain constitutionality
due to the direct and obvious effects of railroad labor disputes on
interstate commerce. Thus, unlike the NLRA, the RLA did not
push the limits of the federal government's commerce power. What
the RLA and NLRA shared in common was the doctrine of exclu-
sive representation, and for both laws this fact raised the question
of whether Congress unconstitutionally had interfered with the
ity representative would require the employer to bargain exclusively with that
representative. See, for example, E. G. Latham, Legislative Purpose and Administrative
Policy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 4 Geo Wash L Rev 433, 453 (1936). The
NLRB soon rejected that argument and held that an employer is not required at all unless
and until a union establishes majority representation. Mooresville Cotton Mills, 2 NLRB
952 (1937).
Otherwise, the nearest thing to a statutory basis for minority representation is a proviso
in Section 9(a): "That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right to
present grievances to their employer." But the "right" belonged more to an employer than
an employee. The proviso did not require an employer to receive, discuss or adjust an em-
ployee's grievance; it merely insulated the employer from liability for dealing separately
with an individual employee. See Emporium Capwell Co. v Western Addition Community
Org., 420 US 50 (1975). Moreover, Congress later amended the proviso to protect a majority
union's primacy. Any resulting grievance adjustment must not be inconsistent with the ma-
jority union's contract with the employer, and the majority union has a right to be present
at the meeting between the employee and employer. 29 USC § 159(a).
216. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 172-83, 204-10
(cited in note 124).
217. Id at 173-88.
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right of contract of individual employees and employers. The
Court's first answer appeared to be, "yes."
In Virginian Railway Co. v System Federation No. 40,218 the
employer railroad challenged a Railway Labor Board bargaining
order by asserting that the RLA did not create any enforceable
duty to bargain. Among the employer's specific complaints was
that the Board's order forbade it to make contracts with individual
employees, but the RLA did not prohibit such contracts. Solicitor
General Stanley Reed, briefing the Court as amicus curiae, seemed
to agree with this interpretation of the Act, perhaps out of fear
that complete abrogation of individual bargaining would lead the
Court to scuttle the entire RLA (and the Wagner Act, by implica-
tion).2 19 Reed offered a solution, which the Court embraced. The
Act and the Board's order, the Court opined, barred only negotia-
tions with any representative other than the elected union. The
Act did not preclude "such individual contracts as petitioner may
elect to make directly with individual employees.
2 20
The Court's reasoning rescued the RLA from the petitioner's
principal constitutional challenge. As to the question of exclusivity,
however, Virginian Railway Co. offered the labor boards half a
loaf. In the Court's view, there was nothing wrong with a rule
designed to prevent inter-union rivalries (especially those fo-
mented by company-established unions) by restricting an employer
to dealing with a single "representative." But the Court's interpre-
tation of the RLA (and by implication the Wagner Act) suggested
there was nothing to prevent direct dealing with individual em-
ployees in circumvention of a union. Such an interpretation would
have been fatal to the Wagner model of collective bargaining.
The Court's statement regarding exclusivity, however, was am-
biguous. While it seemed to suggest an employer was free to bar-
gain individually with employees at any time, it was susceptible to
another view. The Court may have intended only that a union's
exclusivity would not prevent an employer from continuing its bus-
iness if the employer was unable to reach agreement with the
union. It was clear, as the Court noted elsewhere in its opinion,
that the law did not compel an employer to reach agreement with a
union. Implicitly, an impasse or failure in collective negotiations
would leave the employer free to continue its business by offering
218. 300 US 515 (1937).
219. Virginian Ry. Co., 300 US at 548 n 6.
220. Id at 549.
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its own terms to as many individual employees as were willing to
accept those terms. If this was the Court's meaning, it was not far
from the law that subsequently evolved under exclusive
representation.221
Nevertheless, the Court's unfortunate vagueness in Virginian
Railway Co. was enough to leave the system of exclusive represen-
tation in doubt. The Court's landmark decision two weeks later in
NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.222 did nothing to resolve
the uncertainty. Jones & Laughlin Steel was a signal triumph for
the proponents of federal intervention in collective bargaining, for
it upheld the Wagner Act's constitutionality and put to rest many
doubts about the Board's authenticity and power. But while the
Board and its proponents celebrated Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
as a decisive victory,223 that decision's effect on the doctrine of ex-
clusive representation was unclear. The Court had defended the
Wagner Act by drawing on its questionable analysis in Virginian
Railway Co. The Act did not impair the right of contract, the
Court reasoned, because Section 9(a) "does not prevent the em-
ployer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring indi-
viduals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by unilateral action
determine.' ,224
Despite the Court's reservations, the Board continued to apply
the doctrine of exclusivity it had inherited from the earlier labor
boards.22 5 Not until 1944, in J.L Case Co. v NLRB,226 did the Su-
221. See NLRB v Katz, 369 US 736 (1962); NLRB v Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 US
333 (1938).
222. 301 US 1 (1937).
223. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 229-31 (cited
in note 124).
224. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US at 45, quoting Virginian Ry. Co., 300 US
at 548 n 6.
225. See, for example, Boss Mfg. Co., 3 NLRB 400, enforced in part, 107 F2d 574 (7th
Cir 1939) (employer unlawfully refused to recognize union as representative of those bar-
gaining unit employees who had voted against representation); Stewart Die Casting Corp.,
14 NLRB 872, enforced in part, 114 F2d 849 (7th Cir 1940) (employer unlawfully offered
but refused to recognize union as the representative of nonmembers); National Motor Bear-
ing Co., 5 NLRB 409, enforced, 105 F2d 652 (9th Cir 1939) (employer unlawfully negotiated
with minority union in unit represented by an exclusive representative).
Contemporary observers were understandably skeptical or confused. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported in the October 1939 Monthly Labor Review (reprinted at 5 LRRM
(BNA)) 1027:
Union recognition of either type [exclusive or nonexclusive] will not in itself pre-
vent whatever individual negotiations an employee might wish to conduct, but group
negotiations by nonmembers would not be permitted when the union is recognized as
the sole bargaining agency.
Monthly Labor Review, 5 LRRM at 1031.
226. 321 US 332 (1944).
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preme Court clearly approve this course. In J.L Case, the em-
ployer, having negotiated individual yearly contracts with most of
its employees, refused to bargain with a newly elected union until
all the individual contracts expired. The Court upheld the Board's
finding that the employer's conduct was an unlawful refusal to
bargain:
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their
execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the
procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to col-
lective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly as-
certained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to
limit or condition the terms of the agreement.
227
As for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and Virginian Railway Co.,
the Court dismissed its earlier comments on individual contracts as
mere dicta.2
With J.I. Case Co., the first NLRB's Houde decision was vindi-
cated and the doctrine of exclusive representation was assured.
Criticism of exclusive representation was not quieted by J.L Case,
but over the next half century debate turned mainly to the need
for supplementary rules safeguarding the interests of individual
employees in "majority" dominated bargaining units.
F. Limitations on the Power of Exclusivity
The Wagner Act accomplished two important goals for the labor
movement. First, it created a right to engage in collective bargain-
ing, and it gave life to that right with the power of exclusive repre-
sentation. Second, it legitimized a union's excercise of the power of
exclusivity by adopting one form (if not the full substance) of the
labor movement's vision of industrial democracy. Workplaces were
to be divided into one or more voting units; employees within each
unit would vote for or against representation; and the choice of the
majority would be binding on all in accordance with American po-
litical tradition. A union's continuing power to negotiate for all em-
ployees, including nonmembers or unwilling members, would be
based on the collective consent of the employees, rather than the
union's coercive economic power. A union might still exert lawful
coercive power against employees, such as by picketing in support
of a strike, but in general the law limits such action to those situa-
227. J.L Case Co., 321 US at 337.
228. Id at 336.
Vol. 30:779
Exclusive Representation
tions in which the union legitimately claims majority-based repre-
sentative status and reflects the collective will of the employees. 29
Still, even many supporters of the doctrine foresaw some danger
to the rights and interests of individual employees. Thus, as the
old NLRB had predicted in Houde, once exclusivity was estab-
lished as doctrine, lawmakers, administrators and judges turned
their attention to the problem of protecting individual employees
from the majority's abuse of power. The first and most obvious
price of exclusivity was a series of federal law restrictions against
union conduct that endangered the democratic and consensual
character of the Wagner Act model of employee representation.
Even without the subsequent amendments, the Wagner Act's
doctrine of exclusivity contains a few inherent limitations to guard
the interests of individual or minority employees. Most impor-
tantly, the doctrine does not require all employees to accept mem-
bership in a union.230 In this regard, an exclusive representative's
power over a unit falls short of the power suggested by some of the
rhetoric of "industrial democracy." An exclusive representative is
neither a workplace government nor even a partner in government.
Its role is that of a bargaining agent, and its power derives primar-
ily from the employer's duty to bargain with the union and "to
treat with no other." Moreover, exclusivity does not create any em-
ployee duties to the union. Employees are not "citizens" of the
union. Their duties, if any, arise only from a contract of member-
ship voluntarily accepted on an individual basis. Thus, for exam-
ple, a nonmember employee has no enforceable duty to observe a
picket line, to support a work stoppage, or to contribute financially
to the union's collective bargaining expenses.2 31
Of course, lack of power to compel membership is not a very
substantial break against a union's abuse of its power over bargain-
ing or grievance adjustment. The union might be too willing to sac-
rifice minority interests in order to achieve benefits for the major-
ity, or it may simply ignore the minority. Even worse, the union
may have gained or preserved "majority" support by coercion, and
229. See, for example, 29 USC § 158(b)(4), 158(B)(7), and 158(e), restricting a number
of coercive organizational techniques, including picketing by a union that lacks exclusive
representative status.
230. Indeed, a union must not require employees to become members, even if the em-
ployer agrees to a "union shop." In some states a union shop agreement is altogether illegal,
and in the rest a union shop agreement can only require employees to pay periodic dues to
support the union's collective bargaining activities. See NLRB v General Motors Corp., 373
US 734 (1963).
231. But see note 230.
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once entrenched it could use its power for corrupt purposes and
self-preservation at the expense of employee interests. If a union
had unchecked control of bargaining and contract rights, employ-
ees might have no practical remedy for these abuses of power.
Again, however, the Wagner Act doctrine of exclusivity is limited
by some modest built-in restrictions. Under the Act, majority rule
must be exercised only within an "appropriate" unit of employ-
ees,23 partly to prevent the inclusion of those with interests natu-
rally incompatable with a "majority's" interests.
Standing alone, the requirement that units must be "appropri-
ate" is insufficient either to eliminate all diversity or to prevent
other reasons for the misuse of power. Thus, in the decade follow-
ing the Wagner Act, growing fear of union power led to Congress'
next major labor law initiative, a battery of restrictions against
union interference with "individual" and employer rights. In the
Taft-Hartley Act,233 Congress declared an employee right not to
participate in concerted activities, and it prohibited various forms
of union coercion that might interfere with the democratic selec-
tion of representatives. In the Landrum Griffith Act,234 Congress
added a union member's bill of rights to assure that a union would
be democratic in its internal management. The Supreme Court
added perhaps the most important restriction of all when it fash-
ioned a "duty of fair representation" as a quid pro quo for a
union's exclusivity, providing a remedy at least for the most egre-
gious abuses of power.23 5
232. 29 USC § 159(b).
233. Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (1947).
234. Pub L No 86-257, 73 Stat 519 (1959).
235. The Court first recognized the duty in a Railway Labor Act case, Steele v Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 323 US 192 (1944), and later extended the duty to cases under the NLRA in
Ford Motor Co. v Huffman, 345 US 330 (1953).
A union breaches its duty of fair representation when its neglect or abuse of employee
rights is arbitrary or in bad faith. Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171 (1967). The earliest cases in
which employees successfully challenged the fairness of a union's representation involved
intentional discrimination against specific, identifiable minority groups. See, for example,
Steele, 323 US 192 (1944) (race discrimination); Syres v Oil Workers Local 23, 350 US 892
(1955) (race discrimination); NLRB v Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers, 520 F2d 693 (6th Cir
1955) (sex discrimination); Retana v Apartment & Elevator Operators Local 14, 453 F2d
1018 (9th Cir 1972) (discrimination against Hispanics); Jones v Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
495 F2d 790 (2d Cir 1974) (discrimination against nonmembers).
Neglect that is the product of less sinister motives is more difficult to attack under this
standard. A union that represents a diversity of employee groups cannot give equal atten-
tion to all interests, especially when some interests conflict with others. Thus, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Ford Motor Co. v Huffman, "The complete satisfaction of all who are
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
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Unions did not willingly accept each of these restrictions as the
cost of exclusivity, and they have often chafed under these new
duties and liabilities. Nevertheless, the laws against union coercion
and misuse -of power seem a small price to pay for the enhance-
ment and legitimization of union bargaining power. Unions still
embrace exclusive representation in collective bargaining as their
raison d'etre. Even employers by and large have found virtue in
exclusivity, accepting that the law will require bargaining on some
basis in any event. If a majority union could not act as an exclusive
representative, the employer might have to deal with any number
of fractious and volatile rival unions. Unions might be less inclined
to compromise for fear of appearing softer than their competitors,
and if a union did reach agreement with the employer, there could
be no guarantee that employees in other unions would observe the
agreement.
Hence, exclusive representation is now relatively uncontrover-
sial. Of the few remaining critics, most have continued to focus on
the danger that exclusivity concentrates too much power in a
union to the detriment of individual employees. 2s6 On the other
hand, the doctrine's limiting effect on employee representation has
received comparatively scant attention. After all, a doctrine that is
so important to a union's ability to engage in effective collective
bargaining is not immediately suspect as an impediment to the or-
ganization of employees. However, while the doctrine strengthens
established unions and makes effective collective bargaining possi-
ble, unions may have sacrificed a much broader constituency. The
law and labor movement's focus on exclusivity prevents the exten-
sion of union representation into many currently unorganized
workplaces where unions cannot achieve majority support for the
Wagner Act model of collective bargaining. The next section of this
Article will explore this effect of exclusivity.
JI. THE DOCTRINE OF EXCLUSIVITY AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE
ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYEES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
Exclusivity strengthens the collective bargaining process when a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents ... " Ford Motor Co.,
345 US at 338.
236. See, for example, George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and
the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished? 123 U Pa L Rev 807
(1975); David Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accomodate Collective Bargaining by
Professional Employees? 99 Yale 1 J 689 (1990) (advocating a loosening of the doctrine of
exclusivity for bargaining groups of professional employees).
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union is able to achieve majority status, but in most private sector
workplaces there is no majority union. 3 7 For millions of American
workers the NLRA is simply irrelevant.
It would be a mistake to conclude that the comparatively low
rate of unionization reflects equanimity or apathy on the part of
American workers. Recent polls indicate most Americans are favor-
ably disposed to unions and believe workers are better off when
they are represented by unions.23 8 Why then, have most employees
rejected union representation? For many employees in nonunion
workplaces, the answer is that they have not rejected union repre-
sentation. Some employees who want representation cannot have it
because the system of majority-based collective bargaining limits
union representation to a workplace-by-workplace establishment of
majority support. Other employees who have voted against union
representation may have rejected only the scheme of representa-
tion established by federal law, not union representation in
general.
There are, of course, other likely and well-documented factors in
the stagnation of private sector unionism,23 9 but even without
these additional factors the system of exclusive representation
would tend to limit the growth of the organized workforce in at
least two ways. First, the system depends on majority rule for its
legitimacy, and thus it limits effective representation to those par-
ticular workplaces where a majority favor representation. Second,
majority rule necessitates an electoral system that tends to dis-
courage the establishment of majority support for union represen-
tation in most workplaces.
237. In 1991, union representation continued its gradual decline to 18.2% of the
workforce, down from 18.3% in 1990. US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Em-
ployment and Earnings 228 (Jan 1992).
238. See Princeton Survey Research Associates, People, the Press and Politics 1990,
(released Sept 19, 1990) (71% of respondents agree or completely agree that "labor unions
are necessary to protect the working person"); Dialog Information Services, Yankelovich
Clancy Shulman (released Mar 19, 1990) (73% of respondents believe American workers
"still need" labor unions, and 73% believe a worker has "a better chance to win increased
bnefits and wages as part of a union").
In response to some other questions, however, the American public is much more reserved
in its support for unions. Only 26% "would be interested in joining a union if it were possi-
ble" at their place of work. Id. Over half (55%) of respondents in the Yankelovich survey,
and 40% in the Princeton survey, believed unions exert "too much power."
239. These include structural changes in the American economy and workforce, em-
ployer coercion, and competition for investment capital between union and nonunion firms.




A. The Selection of a Representative: "Majority Rule" and the
Electoral Process
The principle of majority rule gives legitimacy to a single repre-
sentative's claim to speak for all employees without evidence of
unanimous individualized consent, and in this regard majority rule
and exclusivity lay the foundation for strong, stable and effective
collective bargaining relationships. But the majority rule principle
also naturally limits union representation to those "units" in which
a majority favor union representation.
The impact of the majority rule principle in limiting union rep-
resentation would be decidedly less if employees or unions could
tailor their electoral and bargaining units to reflect the desires of
employees so that "pro-union" employees could be segregated from
"anti-union" employees. Alternatively, the scope of union repre-
sentational rights might be greatly expanded in some industries if
it were possible to conduct elections on industry, regional or na-
tional bases, thus sweeping together hundreds of thousands of em-
ployees in competing enterprises in a single national bargaining
unit. However, neither of these alternatives is possible in American
labor law. Instead, American labor law favors a relatively frag-
mented electoral and unit-formation process in which the senti-
ments of individual employees are hardly considered.
1. The Selection of an Electoral Unit
Majority rule can exist only within a defined unit of employees
eligible to vote.240 Employees must form a unit to decide whether
to accept a union's representation. If a majority choose to accept a
union's representation, the same unit will be the bargaining unit
that is the extent of the union's representation. The task of identi-
fying "bargaining units" suitable for the exercise of majority rule
may seem a mundane and technical aspect of American labor law.
It is, however, essential to the system and of enormous strategic
importance to unions and employers.
Unfortunately, there is no manifestly correct rule for identifying
the content and limit of a bargaining unit. Senator Wagner be-
lieved that framing any rule in this regard was among the most
difficult challenges posed by the system of bargaining he offered.24'
240. In contrast, Japan lacks a doctrine of exclusive representation and has no legal
process for establishing a "bargaining unit." Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor
Law at 38-39 (cited in note 4).
241. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 145-46 (cited in
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From the very beginning, however, one rule has prevailed consist-
ently in American labor law: the unit for an initial representation
vote must be no larger than a single employer's workforce. 242
Thus, each separately managed and controlled workforce is sov-
ereign. The Wagner Act rule against Board-directed, multi-em-
ployer units24 3 appears to have been a compromise to mollify anxi-
ety in the business community, but even some union leaders
supported the rule out of fear that multi-employer voting units
would enable a tide of "industrial" unions to sweep away tradi-
tional craft unions. 44 In any event, the localization of units fol-
lowed naturally from the rhetoric of "industrial democracy," which
envisioned each workplace as an industrial polis. Compared with
industry-wide units, single-employer units permit greater attention
to individual interests, greater opportunity for personal involve-
ment in workplace governance, and a more personal and responsive
form of employee representation. Local bargaining also leads to
more detailed agreements that can be customized to the special
characteristics of the employer and its workforce.
But the localization of bargaining units creates important limita-
tions for union efforts to organize employees. The workplace-by-
workplace approach magnifies the cost of a union's efforts and
even with the best efforts some workplaces will remain nonunion.
Unfortunately, in order obtain the full economic advantages of ex-
clusivity, unions need ultimately to organize on a national or at
least a regional basis so that labor costs will not be a factor in com-
petition between employers. Otherwise, a few nonunion firms can
note 124).
242. 29 USC § 159(b) ("the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." Id (emphasis
added).
Prior to 1935, there was at least one episode of government mandated collective bargain-
ing based on a multi-employer unit. During World War I the federal government national-
ized many railroads and negotiated contracts covering certain groups of employees of all
employers in the industry. The railroads successfully opposed the continuation of multi-
employer bargaining when they returned to private control. See notes 150-53 and accompa-
nying text.
243. Once a workplace has voted in favor of representation, it may voluntarily
"merge" with other established bargaining units of other employers to form a multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit. Moreover, despite the Act's prohibition against multi-employer units
in an initial vote on representation, the Board has developed a series of rules that favor
continuation of multi-employer units for bargaining and certain electoral purposes once
such units form. See generally Robert Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and
Collective Bargaining 86-92, 408, 455 (1976) (hereinafter "Basic Text on Labor Law").




threaten the success and security of unionized firms. Even when a
union seems to achieve nationwide organization in an industry, as
the United Auto Workers once did, its representative status in ex-
isting workplaces cannot guarantee representation at new work-
places established to compete with or replace old ones, and the
comparative economic advantage enjoyed by nonunion firms leads
inexorably to the emergence of such firms in any heavily unionized
industry.2 4 5 The threat of nonunion competition is often a key is-
sue in an employer's effort to defeat a union's organizational cam-
paign, and may be an important reason why many employees dis-
pair and vote against unions for their own workplaces.
Since American labor law prohibits multi-employer units in in-
tial representation elections, regional or nationwide organization is
at least extremely difficult, and over the long run it is probably
impossible. What of the extreme opposite approach? Very small
units could offer some organizing advantages to unions. If unions,
in defining their prospective units, were free to target very specifi-
cally pro-union employees within each workplace, they might
achieve at least a modest presence in every workplace and provide
representation to most employees who want it. However, American
labor law also limits this organizational strategy, 2 6 and the process
of defining a unit actually has little to do with distinguishing union
supporters from nonsupporters. It is only after a unit is defined
that the question of an individual's support for a union becomes
important.
It is not hard to see why individual preference must count for so
little. A unit defined by individual support for a union will likely
fail to include at least some employees who share exactly the same
skills and responsibilities as those who were included. A unit that
is underinclusive in this way will be difficult for a union to re-
present in collective bargaining. The unit will lack bargaining
245. See generally Hirsch, Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms
(cited in note 239).
246. During the early years after the Wagner Act, the Board often favored units that
corresponded closely with the areas of a union's greatest success. See, for example, Botany
Worsted Mills, 27 NLRB 687 (1940). Congress, however, amended the law in 1947 to pro-
vide, "in determining whether a unit is appropriate . . . the extent to which the employees
have organized shall not be controlling." 29 USC § 159(c)(5). The "extent of organization" is
still pertinent to unit definition under this rule, but some courts have discouraged the Board
from giving it significant weight by requiring the Board not to consider extent of organiza-
tion unless other factors substantially support the unit. See, for example, NLRB v Western
& Life S. Life Ins. Co., 391 F2d 119 (3d Cir 1967), cert denied, 393 US 978 (1968); Local
1325, Retail Clerks v NLRB, 414 F2d 1194 (DC Cir 1969).
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power because similarly skilled employees outside the unit will
work for the employer in the event of a strike, thus diminishing
the union's strike threat. Moreover, nonunit employees of identical
skills and responsibilities will be free to negotiate comparatively
better terms or to enjoy the benefits of the union's gains without
any personal sacrifice. Thus, an underinclusive unit invites all the
problems that exclusivity is designed to prevent.
A unit based on individual preference could also be overinclusive
by cutting across different work classifications to include employ-
ees of wholly different skills and responsibilities. Like underinclu-
siveness, overinclusiveness can complicate a union's tasks, but for
different reasons. The inclusion of dissimilar employees in the
same unit can make the unit unmanageable if different groups
have conflicting interests and goals the union cannot reconcile. For
example, highly skilled employees whose pay lags behind the going
rate outside the company may take an aggressive bargaining posi-
tion that unskilled employees will think greedy and that can only
be fulfilled at the expense of unskilled employees. The resulting
division will weaken the union and complicate the bargaining
process.
Arguably, unions should be allowed to choose whatever unit they
can successfully organize and bear the risk that the unit will be
weak or unmanageable. In general, a union will find a small, under-
inclusive unit easiest to organize,247 and once such a unit is estab-
lished the union may hope to augment its power by organizing ad-
ditional employee groups piecemeal. However, other parties also
have a keen interest in the scope of a proposed bargaining unit.
For an employer, units that cut across different job classifica-
tions, or that divide a workforce into several separate jurisdictions
will make personnel management much more complicated, espe-
cially if units lack any correspondence with the employer's organi-
zation and management of its workforce. Moreover, too many units
will require many separate policies and practices, eliminate the
economies of scale that might be enjoyed by company-wide bene-
fits plans and personnel management, and multiply the company's
risk of strikes.
Individual employees also have a strong interest in the scope of a
proposed unit. For the individual, unit scope has important impli-
247. See, for example, Unions, Management Consultants Offer Varying Views on
Drop in Union Win Rate, Labor Relations Week 425, 426 (May 8, 1991), reporting the view
of one management consultant that new rules reducing the size of units in the health care
industry will tend to increase the union win rate in that sector.
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cations beyond the obvious question of whether the individual
wants the union's representation. An individual employee who sup-
ports the idea of collective bargaining in principle nevertheless
may suffer in a unit that is overinclusive. If different classifications
of employees are combined within a single unit that has voted for
representation, the smaller group may see its interests sacrificed to
promote the interests of the larger "majority" group.
Thus, unit definition must be based much less on employee pref-
erence than on a congruity of employee interests, the company's
managerial organization, and the proposed unit's ability to fulfill
the advantages of exclusive representation. Unfortunately, the
many factors that could be included in the definition of a unit will
not necessarily lead to a single set of possible boundaries. It often
happens that a proposed unit is satisfactory for the union's pur-
poses but does not correspond well with an employer's organization
and management of its workforce.
In many cases the definition of a unit is something about which
the employer, union and individual employees may well disagree.
And their disagreement is often aggravated by strategic factors
that have nothing to do with the manageability, effectiveness or
homogeneity of the unit. In a representation proceeding to estab-
lish a unit and conduct an election, an employer or union's first
concern may be the outcome of the vote, and both are usually
aware of the voting sentiments of different groups of employees. 48
The definition of the unit may be a critical factor in determining
whether or not a "majority" will favor representation. Manipula-
tion of the boundaries of the unit, or "gerrymandering," can dilute
the strength of an otherwise predominant employee faction. The
employer, hopeful of defeating the union, may be less interested in
the manageability of the unit than in packing the unit with pre-
dictably anti-union employees. Conversely, the union's immediate
interest may be in drawing the unit tightly around its core of sup-
port in pro-union departments or classifications.
Early skeptics and opponents of exclusivity pointed to the com-
plexity of unit definition as one reason why majority rule might fail
as a fair and practical way of appointing an exclusive representa-
tive.2 49 If a union petitioning for recognition were permitted to de-
248. The union will have this information from the authorization cards it will have
collected from employees. The employer will rely on its supervisors' familiarity with employ-
ees and the presumption that more skilled employees, or those with higher reaching career
ladders, are most likely to be anti-union.
249. See Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board at 134, 138 (cited
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fine the electoral unit, its selection would be unduly influenced by
its desire to win an easy election. If the employer, as manager of
the workforce, were permitted to define the bargaining unit, its
choice would gravitate toward a unit that would be most difficult
for the union to organize.
Naturally, the solution was that neither employer nor union
should control unit definition. Instead, Congress awarded the re-
sponsibility of identifying "appropriate" bargaining units to the
NLRB. But the Act provides the Board with little guidance as to
how unit determinations are to be made. It is most clear about
what the Board must not do in defining units. For example, the
Board must not give "controlling" weight to the "extent to which
employees have organized. 2 5 0 In other words, the Board must not
be guided solely by evidence that a particular set of employees
desires a union. Individual employee preference is not completely
irrelevant, but it tends to be lost in an assortment of factors that
include the similarity of each subgroup's earnings, benefits, hours,
work and qualifications; their frequency of contact or interchange;
their geographic proximity; the continuity or integration of the
production processes in which the subgroups work; their common
supervision; and their place in the employer's administrative
organization.
251
Thus, unions are restricted at both ends of bargaining unit law.
At one end, rules limiting electoral units to a single employer (and
usually a subdivision of an employer) prevent unions from organiz-
ing employees on an industry-wide basis. At the other end, bar-
gaining unit law prevents unions from tailoring units according to
employee preference. These limitations are inherent in a system
that requires the creation of electoral units that are both practical
and democratic.
in note 124).
250. 29 USC § 159(c)(5). One of the NLRB's predecessors, the National Labor Board
(NLB), which conducted elections in 1933 as part of its dispute resolution function, first
insisted that the organization of employees for collective bargaining was "a matter which
concerns primarily the employees themselves. . . .It is not for the employer or this Board
to dictate the type of organization which should be established." Budd Mfg. Co., 1 National
Labor Board 58, 60 (1933). By 1934, however, it was clear to the NLB's chairman, Senator
Wagner, that the determination of a unit for purposes of voting or bargaining could not be
left entirely to employees. If representation was to be based on majority rule, and if the
government was to promote effective collective .bargaining, the federal government would
have to have a decisive role in determing the basis for the organization of employees. See
Tomlins, The State and the Unions at 123 (cited in note 38).
251. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law at 69 (cited in note 243).
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2. The Election of an Exclusive Representative
Another feature of majority rule-based exclusive representation
is its need for a democratic system for identifying the "majority"
choice. In the Wagner Act, Congress authorized the Board to ascer-
tain the majority representative by secret ballot election or "any
other suitable method. ' 252 Thus, the Board routinely certified a
union as a majority representative on the basis of "authorization
cards" collected by the union from individual employees over an
extended length of time.
An authorization card system, however, is subject to a number of
problems undermining its legitimacy. The card collection process
may expose employees to subtle forms of union or employer coer-
cion, fraud and misrepresentation that are difficult to regulate,
prevent or remedy. Moreover, the process has no particular time
frame. It might take place quickly and secretly with little opportu-
nity for debate and informed decision. On the other hand, cards
collected over a very long period of time may present a misleading
picture of employee support. An employee's authorization card
may indicate only that he wanted a union last month, even though
he would vote against the union today.
Congress amended the Act in 1947 to require, in most instances,
a secret ballot election to determine majority choice. 53 Unions still
collect authorization cards, but only to establish the requisite
"showing of interest" necessary to invoke the Board's election ma-
chinery, or to justify the imposition of a Gissel remedy if an em-
ployer's unlawful opposition has made a fair election impossible. 54
An election takes a snap-shot picture of the union's support
among the employees. It usually takes place only after a period of
regulated debate between the union and employer, and the secret
ballot process protects employees from coercion. But the Board-
conducted electoral system also creates or magnifies problems that
impede union organizational efforts and undermine collective bar-
gaining even by unions that win elections.
First, the election system creates a relatively compressed time
frame for debate between a union and employer, and this fact is
generally to an employer's advantage. The comparatively greater
financial resources of a substantial employer (the very kind of em-
ployer unions need most to target in order to reverse their decline)
252. Section 9(c), 49 Stat 449, 543 (1935).
253. Section 101, Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136, 144 (1947).
254. See NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 US 575 (1969).
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is an especially important factor when the campaign is short and
intense. In a short campaign, perfectly legal propaganda by either
side can generate a very high level of emotion, fear, hope and inse-
curity that will not have dissipated in the relatively short walk to
the ballot box. An employee's decision is all the more likely to be
based on fleeting campaign images appealing to emotional urges
rather than reason and experience. An employer's well-financed
campaign supported by professional consultants, psychologists,
speech writers, artists, video production specialists, attorneys and
the employer's entire management force will have a decided edge
against a small handful of professional union organizers working
from a comparatively meager budget.2 55
This aspect of the election system magnifies another problem
that has its source in the very foundation the NLRA's style of col-
lective bargaining. Since the Act bestows no substantial rights or
powers on a union that loses an election, an employer's stake in an
election is, from management's point of view, enormous. If the
union wins the balloting, it acquires the exclusive right to bargain
for the unit. But if the union loses the election, the employer
avoids the union "problem" entirely. As a practical matter the
union will have no significant presence until it is willing and able
to invoke the Board's machinery for another election.
In nations lacking a system of exclusivity, such as Japan, there
are no elections and no stark election results; employers must deal
on some basis with any and all employee "representatives." This
fact may be" part of the reason why employer resistance to unions
in such countries is less severe-it is simply impossible to avoid
unions altogether.256
Even if a union wins a representation election, the campaign
that preceded the election may be a large factor contributing to
the adversarial relationship that exists between so many American
employers and their unions. An employer faced with a representa-
tion election typically begins by indoctrinating and mobilizing its
managers, supervisors and foremen to oppose the union. Thus, the
255. It is interesting to note that the United Food and Commercial Workers, which
has enjoyed unusual success in expanding its membership, has tended to avoid the election
process and prefers to organize employees where it is possible to gain an employer's volun-
tary recognition based on a card count. Unions, Management Consultants Offer Varying
Views on Drop in Union Win Rate, Labor Relations Week 425 (May 8, 1991). Of course,
this tactic necessarily limits a union's representation to those workplaces in which the em-
ployer is not hostile to the union.
256. Gould, Japan's Reshaping of American Labor Law at 56 (cited in note 4).
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employer's first step is the adoption of an explicitly anti-union pol-
icy to be implemented by managers and supervisors. 57 The em-
ployer trains its managers and supervisors to view the union as an
enemy, and it is painfully clear to them that their value to the
employer will be measured at least in part by their usefulness in
defeating the union. No discrimination laws temper their fear of
punishment for being "soft" on the union because the NLRA does
not protect "supervisors" and "managers. ' 258 If the union wins the
election, managers and supervisors may find it difficult, unneces-
sary or undesirable to unlearn their prejudice against the union.
Naturally, the employer's campaign also has long lasting effects
on the union and employees. Employees will be divided into rival
camps over the issue of unionization and an intense campaign will
worsen the division. The atmosphere of hostility will not simply
vanish with the end of the election. It will linger to poison the at-
mosphere of future contract negotiations and grievance
proceedings.
B. American Labor Law and Nonexclusive Representation
1. What Roles for Nonexclusive Representation?
The Wagner Act endorsed exclusive representation in preferance
to the primary competing systems of the New Deal era: individual
bargaining, and employer-sponsored employee representation
plans. But exclusivity is useful to employees and their unions only
if a union can win majority support.. As a result, most employees
remain untouched by the NLRA model of labor relations law. Mil-
lions have either rejected the NLRA model or they were left be-
hind by unions that failed to persuade a majority of employees to
vote in favor of representation.
Yet a failure to seek representation, or a vote against it, does not
necessarily reflect unqualified rejection of the idea of collective
representation. Many employees who vote "no" in Board-con-
ducted elections may also be discontented with their only apparent
alternative-direct and unassisted individual dealing.
259
257. See, for example, Robert Lewis & William Krupman, Winning NLRB Elections:
Management's Strategy and Preventive Programs 87-95 (Practising Law Institute, Corpo-
rate Law and Practice Handbook, 1979) (hereinafter "Winning NLRB Elections").
258. The Act explicitly removes supervisors from the protection of the law. 29 USC §
2(3). In NLRB v Bell Aerospace Co., 416 US 267 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the
Act implicitly denies protection to managerial employees.
259. See note 238.
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An employee's possibly reluctant vote against a union may be
motivated by anxiety over certain aspects of exclusive representa-
tion rather than satisfaction with nonrepresentation. Indeed, em-
ployers frequently play on employees' fears of certain aspects of
exclusivity, such as the tendancy toward adversarialism and the
dangers of authorizing a "majority" to make important decisions
affecting all aspects of an individual's employment.2 60 Unfortu-
nately, an NLRB ballot does not ask whether a voter wants union
representation on some other or more limited basis. The Act is
designed above all to encourage broad "collective bargaining"
through the appointment of an exclusive representative as the best
way to protect employees, equalize bargaining power and resolve
industrial disputes. However worthy these causes, the Act provides
no system for creating other models of representation, and it even
discourages variation of the model it endorses.
If a labor organization cannot achieve majority status and the
accompanying statutory rights, what could it offer employees?
Full-scale collective bargaining usually is impractical without ex-
clusivity, and the NLRA denies the power of exclusivity to "minor-
ity" unions.2 61 A union might attempt to achieve the equivalent of
legal exclusivity by using the traditional means of coercion against
employers and employees, but the Act forecloses this approach.
Part of the price of legitimizing exclusive representation by major-
ity rule was a prohibition of such coercion. For example, the law
restricts a minority union's strike and picketing activities, 26 2 and if
a minority union neverthless succeeds in negotiating a "unit-wide"
agreement with an accommodating employer, both parties will
have violated the Act's prohibition against "support" of a labor
organization.263
Some types of bargaining, however, do not depend on exclusiv-
ity. For example, an organization that lacks exclusivity may still
260. See, for example, Lewis & Krupman, Winning NLRB Elections at 181-87, 190,
192, 194, 196 (cited in note 257).
261. The Act does not prohibit a members-only contract. Consolidated Edison Co. v
NLRB, 305 US 197, 239 (1938). However, if a union reached such an agreement with an
employer, the parties would confront an impossible dilemma. Since an employer cannot dis-
criminate on the basis of membership or nonmembership in a union, it would likely feel
compelled to extend the terms of the contract to all employees. Doing so, however, risks a
charge that the employer has supported a nonmajority union by giving it the authority of an
exclusive one, in violation of 29 USC § 158 (a)(2).
262. For example, 29 USC § 157(b)(7) restricts "organizational and recognition" pick-
eting, and 29 USC § 157 (b)(4) restricts secondary boycotts for organizational purposes.
263. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v NLRB, 366 US 731 (1961).
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enhance individual bargaining if only by collecting and sharing
wage data that may enable individual employees to bargain from a
more intelligent and educated position.8 4 A nonexclusive union
may also be able to bargain effectively over a particular issue, such
as job safety 65 or an employer's failure to provide parental leave,
without seeking a complete collective bargaining agreement.66
While a minority or nonexclusive union might lack the bargaining
power of a credible strike threat, it could resort to many of the
nonstrike options traditional unions increasingly use in collective
bargaining.267 Nonstrike activities include employee demonstra-
tions, "arm-band" campaigns, public relations tactics and con-
sumer boycotts. Such activities, especially if designed for very lim-
ited and specific goals, may actually encourage wider participation
by employees who would not participate in a general strike or au-
thorize a union as their representative for all purposes.
Unions also have long assisted employees in various nonbargain-
ing activities, such as obtaining or enforcing employee protection
laws. Most contemporary unions view these activities as secondary
to traditional collective bargaining, and they seldom provide such
benefits to employees outside the circle of established bargaining
units. However, the circumstances that led unions to commit to
private collective bargaining as their primary function many de-
cades ago have changed dramatically. In contrast with the situa-
tion during the early years of this century, statutory law is now a
264. See, for example, American Nurses Association Announces Major Workplace
Advocacy Initiative, Labor Relations Week 340 (Apr 10, 1991); ANA Commits to Work-
place Advocacy as Well as Collective Bargaining, Labor Relations Week 639 (July 10,
1991).
265. Employees appear to have a very keen interest in this particular issue, and they
lack confidence either in the government or their employers in regulating workplace
hazards. See James Robinson, Workplace Hazards and Workers' Desires for Union Repre-
sentation, 9 J Labor Research 237 (1988); Higher Priority to Worker Safety Needed, Poll of
Workers Concludes, Labor Relations Week 65 (Jan 17, 1990).
266. In one recent case, for example, a relatively informal organization of Motorola
employees and other persons in the Austin, Texas community engaged in a variety of ac-
tions to deter Motorola from continuing its new drug-testing policy. New ULP Charges
Filed Against Motorola in NLRB Drug-Testing Case, Labor Relations Week 671 (July 17,
1991). In another recent case, employees of Continental Airlines formed an organization, the
intial purpose of which was to intervene in bankruptcy proceedings and negotiate better job'
protection for pilots.
Any "contract" between an employer and a union, even if it is not a traditional collective
bargaining agreement by an exclusive representative, is still enforceable in a federal court
under Section 301 of the Taft Hartley Act, 29 USC § 185. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v
Lion Dry Foods, Inc., 369 US 17 (1962).
267. Growing Numbers of Unions Adopting In-Plant Actions to Avoid Strikes, Labor
Relations Week 801 (July 4, 1991).
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vitally important and effective source of rights and responsibilities
in employment relations. Moreover, state and federal judges not
only permit such legislation, they often supplement it with court-
made employee rights grounded in tort or contract law.2 8
While early employee protective legislation usually compared
poorly with the results of collective bargaining, modern laws often
accomplish much more than employees could hope to gain through
collective bargaining. The Occupational Safety and Health Act,
269
for example, provides a more complete, detailed and ultimately en-
forceable source of workplace safety rules than would be possible
through collective bargaining. Other laws, such as those prohibiting
job discrimination, create rights that unions once found too unim-
portant, divisive or difficult to address through collective bargain-
ing. Still other rights occasionally but not reliably achieved in col-
lective bargaining, such as the right to reasonable notice before a
mass layoff, now extend to all employees by virtue of statutory law
without collective bargaining.
Statutory and court-made employment laws define a very sub-
stantial part of the employer-employee relationship, and some crit-
ics have argued that the emergence of these new laws makes union
representation obsolete. Others have argued to the contrary, that
employee protection laws offer unions an important new role in the
workplace beyond traditional collective bargaining.270
Employee protection laws establish valuable substantive rights,
but their actual impact on the lives of employees depends on the
adequacy of enforcement, and it is in this regard that such laws do
create potential roles for both exclusive and nonexclusive unions. A
perennial problem in workplace regulation has been the impossibil-
ity of careful government monitoring of millions of workplaces;
thus, employee protection laws ultimately depend on employees to
monitor, report, and even prosecute violations. Individual employ-
ees, however, are seldom able to undertake such a responsibility.
Very few employees are fully cognizant of their rights or their em-
ployer's responsibilities. Even when they are aware of specific vio-
lations by their employer, the risk of employer displeasure may de-
ter them from taking action. A union can help, not only by
268. See William Holloway & Michael Leech, Employment Termination: Rights and
Remedies 62-76, 94-105, 210-327 (BNA Books, 1985) (summarizing new contract and tort
theories employees may assert against their employers).
269. 29 USC §§ 651-678 (1988).
270. See, for example, Robert Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Work-
place, 25 USF L Rev 169 (1991).
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providing experienced advice and workplace monitoring, but also
by taking decisive and often antagonistic enforcement action
against the employer on the employees' behalf. The effectiveness of
OSHA enforcement, for example, improves markedly with the
presence of a union at the workplace. 1
Employment discrimination law enforcement can also be en-
hanced by the involvement of labor representatives. While Title
VII and other discrimination laws often provide uniquely accessi-
ble law enforcement procedures for the individual, employees still
face many practical barriers, such as ignorance of the law, the lim-
ited resources of enforcement agencies, and the difficulty of financ-
ing a lawsuit during unemployment caused by discrimination. 72 A
labor organization can educate employees about their rights, file
complaints, assist administrative investigations, collect and share
information, and even prosecute a lawsuit.
Law enforcement activities are not at all new to American un-
ions, although traditionally they have limited such activities to
workplaces in which they have achieved exclusivity. Much more
controversial are nonbargaining union functions suggested by the
renewed interest of employers and employees in improved work-
place communication, participatory management and labor-man-
agement "cooperation." Of course, these themes still resonate with
memories of company unions and employee representation plans.
The NLRA restricts a great deal of experimentation in par-
ticipatory management because many plans fit within the statutory
definition of an employer-supported or dominated "labor organiza-
tion. 27 3 In workplaces beyond the NLRA's coverage, however, are
some examples of attempted accomodation between independent
unionism and participatory management.
The most interesting examples are the workers' councils of many
Western European nations. The workers' councils are elected by
271. Study Concludes Union Presence Leads to Increased OSHA Enforcement, Daily
Labor Report A-1 (Jan 18, 1991). The author of the study, Professor David Weil of the
Boston University School of Management, concluded that OSHA enforcement "seems
highly dependent" on unions, and that "if workers do not become 'partners' in this regula-
tory process, the chances for OSHA success seem dim indeed."
272. See Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, New York
Times Al (July 24, 1991).
273. See 29 USC § 158(a)(2). See also Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 195-96 (cited
in note 243). The NLRB's rules for identifying a "labor organization" and improper "domi-
nation and support are under review in Electromation Inc., NLRB No 25-CA-19818. For a
description of the facts and oral argument in that case, see Union Spokesmen Ask NLRB to




employees to meet with management, share information and dis-
cuss problems and proposals involving the management of the
workplaceM4 Like the notorious employee representation plans of-
fered by American managers before the Wagner Act, the workers'
councils are not independent unions. They are composed only of
employees of the workshops they represent, and they exist only by
virtue of statutory requirement or employer grace. In contrast with
pre-Wagner Act representation plans, however, the councils gener-
ally include many union members who receive a union's aid and
advice and provide an important conduit for union involvement.
The councils also serve as an important part of the European
alternative to American style exclusivity. Without the benefit of a
legal doctrine of exclusivity, European unions do not engage in lo-
cal bargaining as much as American unions do. Bargaining over ba-
sic terms generally occurs at the national level between union and
employer associations-but the workers' councils provide the insti-
tutional foundation for consultation and a bridge for union partici-
pation in local affairs.
27 5
Consultation, of course, must not be regarded as the equivalent
of bargaining. An employer subject to the duty of consultation
need only provide certain information through the council and lis-
ten to the council representatives' proposals. The employer is not
required to "negotiate" any matter, and the council's position,
even if unanimous, is not necessarily backed by a strike threat.
Nevertheless, a duty of consultation provides a kind of "hearing"
for employee interests-a formal means of notice, communication,
discussion and confrontation that may amplify the individual or
collective employee voice. The creation of an employee institution
for consultation also increases the likelihood that employees can
mobilize more substantial opposition to an employer. The mere
fact that management must anticipate such a hearing may well in-
crease its sensitivity to employee interests.
A potential advantage to consultation is that it does not depend
on the majority status of any union. On the other hand, while the
presence of a union, majority or otherwise, is not necessary to con-
sultation, employees may find that union affiliation can still be ex-
tremely useful. A union can be a source of ideas, proposals and
274. See Kennedy, European Labor Relations at 50-57, 175-78 (cited in note 4). A
similar form of consultation exists in many Japanese companies. See Gould, Japan's Re-
shaping of American Labor Law at 99-102 (cited in note 4).
275. See Kennedy, European Labor Relations at 175, 178 (cited in note 4); Bok, 84
Harv L Rev at 1432-38 (cited in note 15).
Vol. 30:779
Exclusive Representation
facts for employee representatives. It may provide professional
evaluation of the employer's information. By its very presence, at
least in the background, it may enhance the employees' leverage
against the employer by providing moral support and the possibil-
ity of collective action, including wider organization for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining.
2. Current Examples of Nonexclusive Representation in
American Labor Relations
Nonexclusive representation for any purpose remains the excep-
tion rather than the rule in America. Exceptions, however, are
some evidence that nonexclusive representation is practical in
some situations.
Even in the United States the NLRA model has never been uni-
versal. The best-established exceptions to NLRA-style exclusive
representation exist in workplaces at or beyond the fringes of the
NLRA where employees and their unions are subject to other fed-
eral or state labor relations laws. Where NLRA-style exclusivity is
not the norm, it is generally because of laws that create special
rights for nonexclusive representatives, or because applicable laws
fail to empower an exclusive representative.
Many public employees enjoy special statutory job protection,
such as civil service or equal employment opportunity proce-
dures.2  Some public employers permit individual employees to
appoint nonexclusive labor representatives in such proceedings,
even when another organization enjoys the exclusive right to re-
present employees in collective bargaining and contractual griev-
ance proceedings. 2
A more substantial variation may be found among public em-
ployees engaged in consultation procedures resembling the Euro-
pean workers' councils. Federal employees, for example, may ap-
point an exclusive representative for collective bargaining in an
NLRA-style election, but even without such an appointment a mi-
nority union may gain the right to consult with management if the
union represents at least 3,500 of the agency's employees or ten
276. For example, many federal employees are subject to the Civil Service Reform Act,
5 USC § 2301 et seq (YEAR). Nearly all states have civil service laws. H. Edwards, R. Clark,
Jr. & C. Craver, Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector 433-34 (4th ed 1991).
277. See, for example, United States Postal Service, 215 NLRB 488 (1974) (describing
the role of a minority union, the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees, in civil
service and EEO proceedings).
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percent of the total workforce . 7 The law of consultation includes
a union's right to reasonable advance notice of an agency's pro-
posed substantive changes in conditions of employment, the
union's right to present its views about the proposal, and the
agency's obligation to "consider" the union's views. 279
Another example of consultation is practised by managerial and
supervisory employees of the Postal Service. The NLRA and Pos-
tal Reorganization Act 28 0 (hereinafter "the PRA") deny collective
bargaining rights to these employees, but under the PRA they may
appoint an organization to serve as their representative in order
"to participate directly in the planning and development" of vari-
ous employment policies. 2 11 "Supervisory" employees must appoint
a single representative on the basis of majority rule, but any organ-
ization representing a "substantial" percentage of "managerial"
employees may represent its members in consultation. 282 The law
of consultation under the PRA requires the Service to notify em-
ployee representatives of proposed changes; permit representatives
to analyze information on which the proposals are based; discuss
the policies in a meaningful, good faith manner; and explain,
before a final decision, reasons for rejecting criticisms of the
proposals.28 3
Still other forms of nonexclusive representation exist for em-
ployees in workplaces where there can be no concept of exclusivity
because the law does not permit it. Many state and local employ-
ees, for example, are subject to laws that prohibit, limit or discour-
age traditional collective bargaining. By necessity, unions repre-
senting these employees have entertained other, nonbargaining
purposes and methods for representing and promoting employee
interests. 28 4 Similarly, there are also some substantial nonbargain-
ing organizations or "quasi-unions '28 5 that promote employee or
278. 5 USC §§ 7113, 7117(d)(1); 5 CFR § 2426.1. See generally Herbert R. Northrup,
Policies and Practices of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, 8 Gov Union Rev 1, 13
(Spring 1987).
279. See National Guard Bureau, 24 FLRA 577 (1986).
280. Pub L No 91-375, 84 Stat 719 (1970).
281. 39 USC § 1004(b).
282. Id.
283. See National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v United States Postal Service, 602
F2d 420, 436, 439 (DC Cir 1979).
284. See Roger Brown & Terrel Rhodes, Public Employee Bargaining under Prohibi-
tive Legislation: Some Unanticipated Consequences, 20 J Collective Negotiations Pub Sec-
tor, no 1, 23 (1991).
285. Bok & Dunlop, Labor and the American Community at 43-54 (cited in note 7).
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"professional" interests in both the public and the private sector.
Public employee unions and quasi-unions may lobby for protective
legislation, monitor compliance with existing legislation, gather in-
formation useful to employees, organize publicity campaigns to
embarrass management, represent individual employees in griev-
ance proceedings, or perform consultative functions without engag-
ing in classic collective bargaining.
Finally, there are some are workplace organizations, often highly
informal, that have emerged spontaneously in response to a partic-
ular crisis. 86 Sometimes these loose organizations dissolve as
quickly as the crisis ends or reaches decisive resolution. Occasion-
ally, nontraditional employee organizations seek a more permanent
existence, and may attempt to negotiate directly with an employer
over a specific, limited and possibly ad hoc agenda, but with no
legitimate claim of exclusive representation. In some cases these
informal and independent organizations arose as alternatives to
traditional unions because their members distrusted established
unions or NLRA-style collective bargaining.287 A few have evolved
into traditional bargaining representatives at workplaces where
they have established majority support.
3. The Failure of Contemporary Unions To Provide
Nonexclusive Representation
If nonexclusive representation offers many opportunities for un-
ions and employees, it may seem strange that unions have not pur-
sued this course with greater vigor. However, there a number of
impediments to the labor movement's greater use of nonexclusive
of "quasi" unions. They began as professional organizations, but eventually offered to re-
present members in collective bargaining as one of their many services.
Lately, the ANA has discovered a need to strengthen its nonbargaining role on behalf of
many members who remain outside established collective bargaining units. See ANA Com-
mits to Workplace Advocacy as Well as Collective Bargaining, Labor Relations Week at
639 (July 10, 1991).
286. See, for example, Apple Workers Mull Collective Bargaining Push, Wall Street
Journal at B-1 (May-June 1991); Non-Union Texas Piece Workers Win Hourly Rates after
One-Day Strike, Labor Relations Week, vol 6 at 55 (Jan 15, 1992) (employees assisted by
legal aid society); New ULP Charges Filed Against Motorola in NLRB Drug-Testing Case,
Labor Relations Week at 671 (July 17, 1991); Tradeswomen Form Group to Promote
Networking in Construction Industry, Labor Relations Week at 547 (June 7, 1989) (describ-
ing new national association of tradeswomen to provide education and training for women in
construction work, to engage in political action, to initiate lawsuits and to provide for
networking and mutual support).
287. See, for example, Apple Workers Mull Collective Bargaining Push, Wall Street




Part of the problem lies in the labor movement's historical com-
mitment to collective bargaining through exclusive representation.
For most of this century, unions have deemphasized nonbargaining
functions that do not require exclusivity. There is some evidence of
a reawakening of nonbargaining activity by unions, especially in
the form of litigation to enforce employee protection laws, infor-
mational publicity campaigns, political action and lobbying.28 Fre-
quently, union action of this sort necessarily benefits many em-
ployees outside a union's membership or representation. 289 Unions
that evolved from professional associations, such as the American
Nurses Association, appear to be the most able and willing to rein-
vigorate such nonbargaining activities.
290
Mainstream unions, however, still chiefly represent and directly
benefit only employees in bargaining units established under the
NLRA.9 1 Not surprisingly, most unions are suspicious of proposals
for new methods of representation, given the historic role of pro-
portional representation and employee representation plans in the
United States. For the labor movement, exclusivity constitutes a
centerpiece of its victory in the Wagner Act. Still, one might ex-
pect unions eventually to overcome their prejudice against other
representation schemes that clearly offer a better means of survival
and expansion.
A greater difficulty is the dilemma nonexclusive representation
poses for a union that hopes to preserve and expand the practice of
288. See James Bennett, Private Sector Unions: The Myth of Decline, 12 J Labor
Research 1 (Winter 1991); Coalition Sues Seagate Technology for Alleged Violations of
WARN Act, Labor Relations Week at 889 (Sept 25, 1991); American Home Products Closes
Plant; OCAW Vows to Fight Runaway Shops, Labor Relations Week at 1021 (Nov 6, 1991);
Robert Tomsho, Unions Search for Regulatory Violations to Pressure Firms and Win New
Members, Wall Street Journal at B-i (Feb 28, 1992). See also note 289.
289. See, for example, UFCW Sues Nordstrom on Behalf of 50,000 Employees in Six
States, Labor Relations Week at 227 (Mar 7, 1990); Paperworkers Leaflet 33 Plants of In-
ternational Paper Co., Labor Relations Week at 433 (May 8, 1991) (joint campaign with
Greenpeace to call attention to employer's health, safety and environmental record); AFL-
CIO Petitions OSHA to Withdraw State Plan Status for North Carolina, Labor Relations
Week, vol 5 at 864 (Sept 18, 1991); Nurses Association Unveils Universal Access Proposal,
Daily Labor Report at A-1 (Feb 8, 1991).
290. ANA Commits to Workplace Advocacy as Well as Collective Bargaining, Labor
Relations Week at 639 (July 10, 1991).
291. "Associate membership" programs for employees outside bargaining units are
currently quite popular, but these programs generally only entitle an employee to partici-
pate in benefit plans. They do not necessarily involve a union's representation of associate
members in dealings with employers. For a description and discussion of the new associate
membership programs, see Northrup, 12 J Labor Research 333 (1991) (cited in note 11).
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NLRA-style collective bargaining wherever it can. From a union's
point of view, a chief advantage of exclusivity is its usefulness in
building and preserving economic power, especially if the union
can organize all or most employers in a particular market. Employ-
ees working outside the circle of exclusive collective bargaining
pose a threat to the union's economic power. Nonunion employees
may replace strikers, accept struck work, or enable a competing
employer to use the advantage of lower labor costs. Should a union
reward such employees by offering them nonbargaining services?
The choice would not be so hard if nonexclusive representation
served as an effective bridge to eventual exclusive representa-
tion."" A union's nonbargaining activities might eventually en-
courage employees to make the transition to full-scale collective
bargaining, and in the long run a union using this technique might
find it easier to overcome or avoid the adversarialism of the typical
representation campaign. If so, unions might find nonexclusive
representation an effective organizational tool for their traditional
collective bargaining goals. There is certainly a risk, however, that
many employees, including currently unionized employees, would
find nonexclusive representation preferable over the long run. If so,
the availability of nonexclusive representation might further erode
the economic power of traditional unions.
A traditional labor union's conflict of interest in representing
employees outside existing bargaining units also creates a potential
dilemma for attorneys the union hires for litigation on behalf of
such employees. A union's long-range interest in organizing em-
ployees for collective bargaining, and in "using" a lawsuit as an
organizational technique, may affect its litigation strategy. It may
wish to expand the scope of the litigation, prolong it, or excite ad-
ditional publicity even when a quieter, more limited action would
achieve quicker and more certain results. Under these circum-
stances, it is questionable whether the union's attorneys can main-
tain their loyalty to both the union and employees. 293 Thus, while
292. The American Nurses Association appears to have adopted this view. American
Nurses Association Announces Major Workplace Advocacy Initiative, Labor Relations
Week at 340 (Apr 10, 1991). See also Tomsho, Wall Street Journal at B-1 (Feb 28, 1992)
(cited in note 288).
For a proposal to amend federal labor law to foster "pre-unions," see Jamin Raskin, Re-
viving the Democratic Vision of Labor Law, 42 Hastings L J 1067 (1991).
293. See, for example, Court Asked to Reinstate Law Firm As Representative of
Workers' in Dispute, Labor Relations Week at 461 (May 15, 1991) (trial court disquplified
union's attorneys from representing employees in an overtime dispute where the union was
simultaneously pursuing appointment as the exclusive representative in collective
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the organizational potential of lawsuits and other nonbargaining
actions may be attractive to unions, there are substantial dangers
in linking organizational goals with representation of employees
outside established bargaining units.
Another possible deterrent for unions is the prospective diffi-
culty of financing nonexclusive representation. Many of the bene-
fits of nonexclusive representation would be enjoyed collectively by
all employees, and this fact will diminish the incentive for many
individuals to provide voluntary financial support. For example, a
nonexclusive representative may achieve a safer workplace, but it
cannot reserve this benefit for paying members only. Thus, an em-
ployee who values a safe workplace might still refuse financial sup-
port because support is not a condition of enjoying the benefit.9
On the other hand, it is questionable whether this problem
would be any greater for nonexclusive representatives than it pres-
ently is for many exclusive representatives. Exclusive representa-
tives also lack any sure means of requiring all employees to con-
tribute. A union can establish a union shop or agency fee shop only
with the employer's agreement, subject to "deauthorization" by
the employees,29 5 and many states prohibit such an agreement.9 6
In some respects a nonexclusive representative would be in a
better position to induce financial support because it can limit the
persons who receive the benefits of at least some nonbargaining
activities, such as representation in individual proceedings and dis-
putes. An exclusive representative, however, is chiefly engaged in
providing purely collective goods, and it is required to represent
even nonmembers in individual grievances by virtue of the "duty
of fair representation."
A key advantage enjoyed by an exclusive representative in fi-
nancing its activities is its opportunity to obtain the employer's
agreement to "checkoff," which is the employer's automatic payroll
deduction for union dues based on individualized consent of an
employee. The NLRA gives exclusive representatives a decided ad-
vantage in this regard. As between a statutory representative and
bargaining).
294. At the American Association of Law School's Workshop on Labor and Employ-
ment Law on April 11, 1992, David M. Silberman, Associate General Counsel for the AFL-
CIO, listed the "free rider" problem as one of the chief reasons for organized labor's dis-
enchantment with "associate membership" programs.
295. See 29 USC § 159(e)(1).
296. See note 20.
Vol. 30:779
Exclusive Representation
an employer, checkoff is a mandatory subject of bargaining,297 but
the NLRA prohibits a minority or nonexclusive union from reach-
ing such an agreement with the employer.298
4. Legal Barriers to Nonexclusive Representation
As the rules of checkoff illustrate, some impediments to nonex-
clusive representation are the result of provisions of the NLRA or
other laws that limit the rights of nonexclusive representatives or
restrict their activities. Chief among the legal impediments is the
NLRA's reservation of important rights to labor organizations that
are exclusive representatives.
The NLRA does grant some important rights for nearly all types
employee organizations. Section 72"9 guarantees the right of em-
ployees to engage in many sorts of "concerted action" for the pur-
pose of dealing with an employer. Employees who join or form a
minority union are protected against employer discrimination, co-
ercion or interference, much as they would be in joining or forming
a majority union.3so But some of the Act's most important provi-
sions create rights only for exclusive representatives.
For example, the NLRA generates principles that enhance an
exclusive representative's legitimacy and continuity, but these
principles have no application to a nonexclusive representative. If
a union wins a Board-conducted election, the law not only legiti-
mizes the union's exclusive authority but also nurtures its con-
tinuity by the "contract bar rule,"30' 1 the "certification year
rule, 3 0 2 and a rebuttable presumption that employees continue to
consent to the union's representation.303 Of course, the election
297. United States Gypsum Co., 94 NLRB 112, amended, 97 NLRB 889 (1951), en-
forced as modified, 206 F2d 410 (5th Cir 1953), cert denied, 347 US 912 (1954).
298. An employer's checkoff agreement with a minority or nonexclusive union would
constitute unlawful support of a labor organization in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act,
29 USC § 152(a). See Hampton Merchants Ass'n, 151 NLRB 1307 (1975). However, some
state laws applicable to state and local employees (who are excluded from the coverage of
the NLRA) now permit or even require checkoff for labor, professional or other employee
organizations, as long as checkoff is based on individual authorization. See, for example,
Chapter 144, Texas Laws 1991.
299. 29 USC § 157.
300. Id. Section 7 does not distinguish between majority or minority unions. Indeed, it
applies even in the absence of any union at all, provided two or more employees act in
"concert." NLRB v Washington Aluminum Co., 370 US 9 (1962).
301. See National Sugar Refining Co., 10 NLRB 1410 (1939); General Cable Corp.,
139 NLRB 1123 (1962).
302. See Brooks v NLRB, 348 US 96 (1954).
303. NLRB v Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 US 775 (1990).
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machinery created by the Act is designed to establish exclusivity
and not any of the alternatives. There are no comparable laws to
strengthen the legitimacy, authority or continuity of alternative
representation. A union cannot petition for recognition or certifica-
tion on a nonexclusive basis, and it cannot seek an election to re-
present employees for a limited purpose, such as occupational
safety and health matters.
More importantly, only an exclusive representative enjoys the
right to compel an employer to bargain. A nonexclusive representa-
tive lacks this right. Given the practical difficulty of collective bar-
gaining without exclusivity, it may seem that the denial of legally
enforceable bargaining rights to a nonexclusive representative is of
little consequence. However, much more is at stake than bargain-
ing in the traditional sense. The legal right to compel bargaining
includes some significant subsidiary rights, such as meeting, con-
ferring, consulting, or perhaps most importantly, receiving infor-
mation about working conditions.304 These subsidiary rights devel-
oped to augment the right to compel bargaining, but in the modern
regulatory world they have value apart from the traditional bar-
gaining process. For instance, a right to inspect the workplace or
receive information about the comparative wage rates of male and
female employees is useful to employees and their representatives
even without bargaining because it fortifies the employees' ability
to enforce existing workplace laws.
Nevertheless, the law not only prevents a nonexclusive represen-
tative from bargaining on any basis (except where the employer is
willing), it also severely limits a nonexclusive unidn's ability to en-
gage in the most important nonbargaining activities, such as moni-
toring workplace safety, collecting data useful to employees, or ar-
ticulating employee interests.3 0 5 None of these activities can
proceed very far without an employer's voluntary cooperation or
the imposition of a legal duty of cooperation. The former is un-
likely and the latter is nonexistent in the private sector. The effect
of this omission in the law is to foreclose the most promising func-
tions of nonexclusive representation.
304. NLRB v Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 US 149 (1956). The employer owes the duty to a
statutory representative not only during negotiations toward a collective bargaining agree-
ment but also during the union's ongoing responsibility for contract enforcement and griev-
ance adjustment. NLRB v Acme Indus. Co., 385 US 432 (1967).
305. See, for example, Emporium Capwell Co. v Western Addition Community Org.,




Another example of this limitation is the Board's denial of so-
called Weingarten0 1 rights to employees outside the traditional
union setting. When an employer attempts to interrogate an em-
ployee about a potential disciplinary matter, the employee can de-
mand the presence of a union agent if the union serves as an exclu-
sive representative. While Weingarten rights evolved in and
specifically for the traditional union, a similar form of representa-
tion could be valuable to employees in the nonunion setting as
well. At the very least a representative can be the employee's own
witness of what transpired in the interrogation, and he may be able
to preserve important evidence or dissuade an employer from im-
pulsive and unjustified disciplinary action. Representation of this
sort could be especially valuable in workplaces with formal, em-
ployer-established investigation or grievance procedures. 07 Never-
theless, the Board and the courts lately have denied any right of
employees to demand access to Weingarten-style assistance
outside the traditional "exclusive" union context.
308
Some NLRA provisions impose the risk of illegality for certain
activities of nonexclusive representatives. Section 8(b)(7)309 re-
stricts a minority union's picketing if the union's purpose is to
achieve exclusive status without an election. A minority union may
have other lawful purposes for picketing, such as protesting spe-
cific action against a member or poor working conditions (without
any demand for recognition),310 but a union's intent and purpose
are seldom indisputable, and if a union has a history of seeking to
represent employees in collective bargaining its purpose is natu-
306. See, for example, NLRB v Weingarten, Inc., 420 US 251 (1975).
307. Many nonunion employers have adopted formal grievance procedures for their
employees. However, without the presence of an independent union representative, employ-
ees are generally too fearful of reprisal or distrustful of employer good faith for such a pro-
cedure to benefit either employees or employers. See Freeman & Medoff, What Do Unions
Do? at 108-09 (cited in note 10).
Union representation could become more important if employers combine their internal
grievance procedures with arbitration, a development recently encouraged by court decisions
enforcing employee agreements to arbitrate. See, for example, Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 111 S Ct 1647 (1991) (age discrimination claim subject to compulsory
arbitration).
308. See, for example, Slaughter v NLRB, 876 F2d 11 (3d Cir 1989); Johnson v Ex-
press One Int'l, 944 F2d 247 (5th Cir 1991); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 NLRB 230 (1985).
The Board has not been entirely consistent on this issue. See Materials Research Corp., 262
NLRB 1010 (1982), which the Sears, Roebuck case overruled.
309. 29 USC § 158(b)(7).
310. See, for example, Automobile Workers Local 259, 133 NLRB 1468 (1961) (picket-
ing to demand reinstatement of employee); Houston Bldg. & Const Trades Council, 136
NLRB 321 (1962) (picketing to protest employer's failure to observe "area standards").
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rally suspect whenever it engages in picketing.311
Perhaps the most important NLRA impediment is Section
8(a)(2), prohibiting employer domination or support of a "labor or-
ganization." Section 8(a)(2) is the Wagner Act's response to com-
pany unions and employee representation plans of the early twen-
tieth century. Today, it also renders suspect many good faith
experiments in employee representation.3 12 While Section 8(a)(2)
does not necessarily prohibit an employer from signing a "mem-
bers only" or other nonexclusive agreement with a minority union,
an employer's willingness to negotiate with a minority union is
nearly always suspect as a form of "support" for the union's at-
tempt to represent all employees.313 Section 8(a)(2) also prevents
the establishment of institutions comparable to European workers'
councils or the consulting unions of the federal workplace. The cre-
ation of such institutions depends almost entirely on employer in-
titiative, so the Board and courts are likely to view any resulting
((organization" as an illegal company-supported union.
The NLRA's preferance for exclusive representation infects
other laws. For example, some laws grant "employee representa-
tives" certain rights to participate in enforcement proceedings, but
these laws sometimes limit rights to exclusive representatives.
Thus, minority or nonexclusive representatives are often deprived
of important opportunities to safeguard statutory employee rights.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act,314 for example, grants
"authorized" employee representatives certain rights to participate
in inspections under the Act,315 but the Department of Labor's reg-
311. See, for example, Painters' Local 130, 135 NLRB 876 (1962); Service Employees
Local 73, 239 NLRB 1233 (1979); Plumbers Local 129, 244 NLRB 693 (1979).
A union violates the restrictions against organizational and recognition picketing if it has
an illegal object, even if the illegal object is not the union's only object. Retail Clerks Local
345, 145 NLRB 693 (1979).
312. See Susan Gardner, The National Labor Relations Act and Worker Participa-
tion Plans: Allies or Adversaries, 16 Pepperdine L Rev 1 (1988); Michael Harper, Recon-
ciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U Pa L Rev 1
(1988); Katherine Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U Chi L Rev 73 (1988). Of course, a representation plan or other
means of participatory management that appears to be in good faith may have an anti-
union purpose, or an employer might eventually use the plan for the purpose of defeating
legitimate representation of employees. Whether such risks are acceptable depends on the
efficacy of other modern legal principles that were unavailable to unions in the early part of
the century, such as the prohibition against interference, coercion and discrimination.
313. See, for example, Consolidated Edison Co., 4 NLRB 71 (1937), enforced, 95 F2d
390 (2d Cir), aff'd, 305 US 197 (1938).
314. 29 USC § 651-78 (1988).
315. 29 USC § 657(e).
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ulations define "authorized representative" as an organization with
a collective bargaining relationship.3 1 Similarly, the Worker Ad-
justment and Retraining Notification Act,3 17 which requires an em-
ployer to give employees and their "representatives" advance no-
tice of a "mass layoff," defines a "representative" as an exclusive
representative within the meaning of the NLRA.1 8
Even federal income tax laws, as one court has recently inter-
preted them, may have the effect of discouraging some forms of
nonexclusive representation. Labor unions ordinarily enjoy tax ex-
empt status for the revenue they collect in initiation fees and dues.
In American Postal Workers v United States,319 however, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that the Postal
Workers Union was engaged in a nonexempt business activity
when it collected associate membership fees from non-Postal fed-
eral employees.
One key factor in the court's opinion appears to have been that
the union failed to treat associate members as true members for
any purpose except insurance eligibility.32 0 For example, associate
members did not participate in the governing of the union, and as
non-Postal workers they were outside the union's avowed jurisdic-
tion for lobbying and collective bargaining. In order to reduce the
risk of tax liability, it would appear a union must offer "associate
members" equal or substantially equal membership rights in union
governance, but equality of membership may not be practical for a
union that continues to see traditional collective bargaining as its
primary purpose.
Another key factor in the American Postal Workers case was
that the sale of associate memberships appeared to be a "trade or
business" in that the Union derived a substantial net profit and
presumably used it for the benefit of other actitivies on behalf of
its "full" members.2 1 In theory, of course, a union could offer
nonexclusive representation services on a non-profit basis, and in
theory perhaps it should. In reality, however, this approach is
likely to diminish any incentive traditional unions have to provid-
ing such services.
316. 29 CFR § 2200.1 (1991).
317. 29 USC §§ 2101-2109 (1990).
318. 29 USC § 2101(a)(4).
319. 925 F2d 480 (DC Cir 1991).
320. American Postal Workers, 925 F2d at 482-83.




Exclusive representation satisfies many practical needs for tradi-
tional collective bargaining, and this much is as true today as it
was in 1935. If employees are to engage in effective collective bar-
gaining, they must be able to prevent the employer from dealing
with individual employees or rival organizations.
Unfortunately, American labor law's single-minded endorsement
of exclusivity as the basis for employee representation is one rea-
son why its future seems so bleak. Exclusive representation is an
incomplete answer to the puzzle of employer-employee relations. If
exclusive representation is a "best" solution for employees, it is no
consolation to most American employees who do not and will not
have exclusive representation. For these currently unrepresented
employees, new forms of representation in nonbargaining activities
may be a more attractive and immediate solution.
While nonbargaining activities based on nonexclusive represen-
tation are not entirely new, re-emphasizing them will not be easy
for American unions formed out of the industrial and legislative
conflicts of the 1930s. A union that is wedded to the goal of collec-
tive bargaining faces many pitfalls in developing a nonbargaining
wing, and American labor law offers no encouragement.
Assuming that unions find sufficient promise in new forms of
representation, statutory reform appears to be essential to unleash
the potential of experimentation. Fairly simple reforms might in-
clude revision of employee protection laws to clarify that a minor-
ity union may qualify as an "employee representative" for pur-
poses of participating in enforcement proceedings. Reforms of
much greater consequence, however, would require fundamental
change in the orientation of federal labor policy. For example, an
amendment to the NLRA could extend to nonexclusive representa-
tives some of the rights Section 8(a)(5) already confers on exclusive
ones.
Legal reforms encouraging the development of employee consul-
tation, whether according to the federal employee model or the Eu-
ropean workers' council model, would require acceptance of ideas
the Wagner Act aimed to foreclose. But there are important differ-
ences in the risks posed by the employee representation plans of
the 1930s and the risks of modern-day participatory management
plans. In the era of employee representation plans, employees and
independent unions lacked any legal protection against employer
interference; coercion or discrimination. An employer could create
a representation plan, threaten independent unionists with dis-
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charge, deny the union and its members any right to participate in
the plan, and declare to employees that efforts to engage in true
collective bargaining would be futile. Today, many of these dangers
are addressed as effectively by the noninterference and nondis-
crimination provisions of the Act as by Section 8(a)(2).
Still, even today employers may be tempted to use limited forms
of consultation and participatory management to oppose collective
bargaining by independent unions. Thus, it may be necessary to
combine any reduction of Section 8(a)(2) with reinforcement of
other laws against employer coercion, interference and and dis-
crimination. The law could also condition the legality of such
schemes on the involvment of any unions representing a "substan-
tial" number of employees.
Whether unions will support such reforms (and their support
would seem to be essential) remains to be seen. Some will doubt-
less fear that the creation of new forms of representation will only
hasten the decline of old ones. But the experiments sketched here
could also energize unions by regaining the interest and participa-
tion of millions of additional employees excluded by the present
system.
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